

** *«/' 



iLK 

■ J 6 


Author 


Title 


Imprint 


10—47372-2 @s*0 




























































































































































































THE TRUE METHOD 

OF ELECTING- 

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES : 

BEING A 

REVIEW OF PAST AND PRESENT SYSTEMS, AND 
OF THE SEVERAL PLANS PROPOSED, 

AND 

SUBMITTING A METHOD MAINTAINING ALL THE VIRTUES OF THE 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, AND ADJUSTING THE PRESIDEN¬ 
TIAL VOTE TO THE POPOULAR VOTE WITH 
ALMOST ABSOLUTE EXACTNESS; 

TOGETHER WITH 

A Fund of Political Information , and Various Statistical 
Facts and Deductions based upon the Popular 
and Electoral Votes of 1876. 


BY AUGUSTUS D. JONES. 


NEW ORLEANS: 

PRINTED AT THE DEMOCRAT OFFICE, 
r 1880. 



























THE TRUE METHOD 


OF ELECTING 

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT 


OF THE 


UNITED STATES: 


BEING A 

REVIEW OF PAST AND PRESENT SYSTEMS, AND 
OF THE SEVERAL PLANS PROPOSED, 

AND 

SUBMITTING A METHOD MAINTAINING ALL THE VIRTUES OF THE 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, AND ADJUSTING THE PRESIDEN¬ 
TIAL VOTE TO THE POPOULAR VOTE WITH 
ALMOST ABSOLUTE EXACTNESS; 

TOGETHER WITH 


A Fund of Political Information , and Various Statistical 
Facts and Deductions based upon the Popular 
and Electoral Votes of 1876, 



NEW ORLEANS: 

PRINTED AT THE DEMOCRAT OFFICE, 

J? 80 , 

TT 


I 





/ r 




Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1877, by Augustus I). Jones, in 
the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 






t 




COMMENDATIONS. 



[Letter from Hon. W. W. Mansfield, ex-Judge of the Fifth Arkansas 
Circuit Court.] 

Dover, Ark., October 9, 1877. 

Mr. Augustus D. Jones, Little Hock—Dear Sir: * * * * In 

hearing the manuscript read, I was very favorably impressed as to 
the merits of your “True Method.” I thought its publication would 
do good, in promoting practical discussion of a question of the grav¬ 
est concern to every lover of his country. * * * I think your 

little book should be well received for it original views and excellent 
style. I wish you well, and hope to hear that your industry and 
talents have been recognized and rewarded. 

Very truly yours, W. W. Mansfield. 

[From the Eussellville, Ark., Democrat, June, 1877.] 

THE TRUE METHOD OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, ETC.; BY AUGUSTUS D. JONES. 

A book bearing the above title, and written at Dover, in this 
(Pope) county, takes into consideration the system of 1789, with 
references to the four elections held pursuant thereto; the Twelfth 
Amendment, with remarks upon the several elections held under its 
provisions; the proposition to elect the President by popular vote, 
showing that it is both impracticable and at variance with the theory 
upon which the Federal Government is founded; the plan of ex-Sena- 
torBuckalew, of Pennsylvania, showing wherein it is at fault; also the 
True Method, which adjusts the Presidential vote of Hayes, Tilden, 
Cooper and Smith, respectively, to their popular vote with so close an 
approximation to exactness as to meet all practical requirements, and 
and allows each State its proper influence in electing the President. 
The book will contain several interesting tabular statements, demon¬ 
strating the author’s views. It is free from partisan bias or sectional 
prejudice, and contains much historical and political information. 

[From the Arkansas State Grange, November, 1877.] 

We have heard the reading of a manuscript entitiled “The True 
Method of Electing the President,” etc., which we understand the 
author, Mr. Augustus D. Jones, intends publishing. It is, we be¬ 
lieve, the fairest and most practicable plan we have ever seen sug¬ 
gested to prevent the recurrence of another such political storm as 
the country encountered at the last Presidential election. It would 
preserve the balance of power between the larger and smaller States, 
and make such a muddle as the last nearly impossible. We hope 
the work, when published, will be in the hands of every Congressman. 

[From the Little Eock Gazette, November, 1877.] 

Senator Garland has introduced in the Senate the memorial of 
Augustus D. Jones, of this city, asking amendment to the Constitu- 





[4] 


tion as to tlie manner of electing the President and Vice President. 
The substance of the proposed amendent is from a work written by 
Mr. Jones entitled “The True Method.” A letter from Col. Cravens, 
of this district, to the St. Louis Republican on the same subject em¬ 
bodies the views of Mr. Jones. 

[From the Little Rock Star, November, 1877. ] 

We clip the following from the Congressional Globe: “Mr. Gar¬ 
land presented the petition of Augustus D. Jones, of Little Rock, 
Ark., praying for an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States in the manner of electing President and Vice President; re¬ 
ferred to the select committee on the subject of the elections of 
President and Vice President of the United States.” Mr. Jones is 
a compositor in this office, and during his leisure hours has written a 
thoughtful book on the above subject., 


CONTENTS. 


The System of 1789—Why it was adopted. 

The Twelfth Amendment—How it has worked. 

Table A, showing the Popular and Electoral Votes of 1876, 

The Rights of the Senate and of the House respectively. 

Relative Strength of States—Their Relations to the Federal Gov¬ 
ernment. 

Table B, showing the number of Popular Votes to one Elector in 
each State in 1876, and the percentages of Popular and Electoral 
Votes by States in 1876, and the gain or loss to each State under the 
Electoral System as against the Popular Vote theory. 

Election by Popular Vote: 

Improbability of its adoption; 

Its Dangers; 

Strength of certain large States in Popular Votes, in each House 
of Congress, and in choosing Presidents. 

The Buckalew Plan; 

Result of 1876 under it—Table C; 

Remarks on same; 

Assumed Result in thirteen States under it—Table D. 

The True Method: 

Details of same; 

Result of 1876 under it—Table E; 

Percentages under the Electoral System of Electoral and Popu¬ 
lar Votes from 1844 to 1872, and comparing them with the 
Result of 1876 under the True Method—Table F. 

Percentages of Popular and Presidential Votes, with gains for 
Hayes and Tilden respectively—Table G. 

General Remarks: 

Area and Population of the Mississippi Valley States—Their 
Prospective Political Power; 

Proposed Constitutional Amendment—Explanatory Remarks. 
Appendix: How to amend the Constitution; The True Method vs. 
the Electoral System, from the Pine Bluff (Ark.) Republican; A Pop¬ 
ular Vote for President, from the New Orleans Democrat; The Presi¬ 
dential Count, from the New Orleans Democrat; Communication in 
the New Orleans Democrat from the Author of the True Me thod; 
How the States Voted. 





THE TRUE METHOD 

r. - * r*. v\+*- • •' -• -•*••'^4'-•?'. *4 nr —-• ~ 

OF ELECTING 

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT 

OP THE UNITED STATES. 


INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 

For many years, public attention has been directed to the palpa¬ 
ble errors of the system by which Presidents and Vice Presidents of 
the United States have been elected from the foundation of the gov¬ 
ernment to the present time, both under the Constitution of 1789 
and the Twelfth Amendment, to each of which methods proper at¬ 
tention will be given hereafter. The great objection, however, to 
either system is not that a person failing to receive a majority of the 
popular vote may, at the same time, be constitutionally chosen Presi¬ 
dent by the Electoral Colleges. This actually occurred in 1844, in 
1848, in 1856 and in 1860. Neither Mr. Polk, Gen. Taylor, Mr. Bu¬ 
chanan nor Mr. Lincoln, at his first election, received a popular ma¬ 
jority, yet each was constitutionally elected; and in 1876 a person 
receiving an actual majority of the popular vote failed of an election 
to the Presidency by the Electoral Colleges. It is not my purpose 
to complain of that result , for I am in no degree governed by a par¬ 
tisan spirit in the investigation of the great question now under con¬ 
sideration, and I only refer to the facts developed as demonstrating 
conclusively the errors of the present system. The error, however 
does not grow out of the fact that a majority of the popular votes 
will not at all times elect the President; but the objection is that the 
vote of a State may so easily be diverted from its proper channel, and 
that the votes of all persons duly qualified in each State are not 
allowed an influence in the general result. Under the existing law 
the votes of the minor it y in a State are not heard of in the final 






Introductory Remarks. 


X 


count. For instance, the thousands of Hayes votes in New York and 
Tilden votes in Illinois were of no avail to either. 

The subject under review has engaged the attention of some of the 
wisest men our country has ever produced—Gen. Jackson, while 
President, and Thomas H. Benton, while representing Missouri in 
the United States Senate, being among the number. Gen. Jackson, 
in each of his eight annual messages to Congress, and Col. Benton, 
in debate in the Senate, favored the substitution of some other plan 
for the Electoral system. In addition to these, several other propo¬ 
sitions for changing the present mode of procedure have been intro¬ 
duced in Congress and discussed by gentlemen of commanding talent 
in both Houses, but no proposed amendment to the Constitution 
which meets the desired end has been submitted by Congress to the 
several States for their action. Quite recently I observe that Mr. 
Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, an ex-Senator in Congress, and a gentle¬ 
man of great learning and ability, has submitted a plan for the 
election of the President without the intervention of Presidential 
Electors. Under these circumstances I approach the investigation 
of the question with some degree of diffidence, and were it not that 
my position is sustained by the logic of mathematical certainty, I 
should feel constrained, to remain silent and to leave the consideration 
of the subject to wiser and abler pens. But as, under our free and 
enlightened institutions, the humblest may aspire to the highest 
honors, and all may present their views, without hindrance from law¬ 
ful authority, upon all questions of public interest, I hope it will not 
be deemed presumptuous in me, though an unpretending American 
citizen, to submit a method which, by the closest scrutiny I have 
been able to give it, assures me that it meets the difficulties surround¬ 
ing the great question under consideration better than any other 
that has fallen under my observation. And believing my position 
and ‘theory to be supported by facts of the most incontrovertible 
nature, I cannot doubt that the views herein presented will meet 
with at least respectful consideration from an impartial public. 

It will be necessary to consider, in the order here stated— 

I. The system of 1789. with references to the four elections held 
pursuant thereto; 

II. The Twelfth Amendment, adopted in 1804, with remarks 
upon tj}£ several elections held under its provisions; 



Introductory Remarks. 


9 


III. The proposition to elect the President by a popular vote of 
all the people as one community, with an array of facts demonstrat¬ 
ing its impracticability; 

IY. The plan of Mr. Buckalew, showing wherein it is an im¬ 
provement and wherein it fails, 

Y. The True Method, showing from the returns of the late Presi¬ 
dential election, that it preserves all the virtues of the Electoral sys¬ 
tem (allowing each State the proportionate influence in a Presidential 
election now provided for) and adjusts the Presidential vote of each 
person voted for upon the basis of his popular vote with almost abso¬ 
lute exactness. 


THE SYSTEM OF 1789. 

This system was founded upon Article II, Section 1, of the Consti¬ 
tution, which provides that “each State shall appoint, in such manner 
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors equal to 
its whole number of Senators and Representatives in the Congress,” 
and the Constitution in this particular is now as it was in the begin¬ 
ning; but prior to the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment each 
Presidential Elector voted for two persons for President, one of whom 
might be chosen to that office and the other Vice President. Under 
that system four different elections were held. 

At the first election the public mind had settled upon the Father 
of his Country as the proper person for the Chief Magistracy of the 
infant republic, and he received a unanimous vote of the Electors. 
In addition to Washington eleven other persons received votes for 
President, and one State (Georgia), with five Electors, voted for five 
different persons. Next to Washington’s vote, that for John Adams 
w r as the highest, and he became Vice President, although he did not 
receive a majority of all the Electoral votes cast. The Vice Presi¬ 
dent was not voted for directly, but with public sentiment so nearly 
unanimous in Washington’s favor, if not entirely so, the votes cast 
for Adams, Clinton, Jay and others must have been given only in the 
expectation of securing the Vice Presidency. 

At the second election (1792) Washington was re-elected by a 
unanimous vote, and only four other persons were voted for, one of 
whom received but four votes and another one vote, showing that 
even at that early day the public mind had begun to concentrate in 
2 






10 


The System of 1789. 


regard to the two highest officers provided for by the Constitution. 
Adams received seventy-seven votes, which was the next highest vote 
to that for Washingion, and became Vice President for the second term. 

At the third election (1796), when it became necessary to choose 
Washington’s successor, I find that in sixteen States no less than 
thirteen persons were voted for as President, yet the public mind 
was quite evenly balanced between Adams and Jefferson—the former 
receiving seventy-one and the latter sixty-eight. Adams became 
President and Jefferson Vice President, though each was supported 
by men of contrary political views. This was one of the anomalous 
results of which the system admitted; and had Adams received two 
votes less and Jefferson two more, Adams w r ould have been elected 
Vice President for the third term. 

When, in 1801, the two Houses of Congress met to witness the 
count of the Electoral votes cast, it was found that Jefferson and 
Burr had seventy-three votes each; Adams sixtj^-five and Pinckne} 7 
sixty-four—showing that Jefferson and Burr were almost as clearly 
pitted against Adams and Pinckney as Hayes and Wheeler were 
against Tilden and Hendricks. There being a tie between Jefferson 
and Burr, it devolved upon the House of Representatives to elect 
one of them as the President, the other to be Vice President. Each 
of the sixteen States at that time comprising the Union having one 
vote, it required#nine States to elect. The first ballot stood eight 
States for Jefferson, four for Burr, and two States in which the rep- 
resetation was equally divided. This resulted in a “dead-lock” which 
the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution had not provided for, 
and affairs assumed a threatening aspect. The balloting continued 
from the eleventh to the seventeenth of February, 1801, w 7 hen, on 
the thirty-sixth ballot, Jefferson was elected. Had the “dead-lock” 
continued until the fourth of March, the United States would have 
been without either a President or Vice President. In order to pro¬ 
vide against such a difficulty thereafter the Twelfth Amendment was 
adopted, and is embodied in the Constitution as Article XII. 


THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT. 

Article XII, commonly called the Twelfth Amendment, preserves 
the system of choosing Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United 




The Twelfth Amendment. 


li 


States by and through the agency of Presidential Electors, but pro¬ 
vides that Electors shall designate, in separate ballots, one person 
for President and another for Vice President. With the exception 
of the election of John Quincy Adams as President by the House 
of Representatives in 1825 and of Richard M. Johnson as Vice Presi¬ 
dent by the Senate in 1837, all the Presidents and Vice Presidents 
have been chosen by a majority of the Electors from the time of Jef¬ 
ferson’s second election to and including the election of 1876. 

Upon an examination of the returns, I find that from 1804 to 1820, 
inclusive. Presidents and Vice Presidents received such decisive ma¬ 
jorities of the Electors that each result must have been in accord 
with the popular wish. In 1824, however, when Mr. Monroe’s suc¬ 
cessor was to be elected, it was found that the public mind had not 
settled in favor of any one person with sufficient force to tide him 
over the shoals of the Electoral system. Gen. Jackson was undoubt¬ 
edly the choice of the greatest number of the people, and of the 
Electors he received the highest vote (ninety-nine), but fell thirty-two 
short of the number necessary to secure his el&tion. John Quincy 
Adams received the next highest number of votes, and William H. 
Crawford the next. 

The choice of one of these for President devolved upon the House 
of Representatives, each State to have one vote. Adams received 
thirteen States, which was a majority, and secured his election. In 
this case the contest was decided by the vote of the solitary member 
from Missouri, which offset the vote of Pennsylvania, with twenty-six 
Representatives. The result was not satisfactory to the majority of 
the people, but it was strictly constitutional, and there was no 
remedy. 

For twenty years after the election of Mr. Adams in the manner 
stated, the Electoral Colleges chose Presidents who had received 
popular majorities. But in 1844 Mr. Polk, and in 1848 Gen. Taylor, 
failed of a popular majority, though duly and constitutionally elected. 
Mr. Buchanan was also a “minority” President, and so was Mr. Lin¬ 
coln, at his first election, when he received less than forty per cent of 
the popular vote. In 1864 Mr. Lincoln received a popular majority, 
and so did Gen. Grant at both his elections. In the several instances 
of “minority” Presidents mentioned, the successful candidate re¬ 
ceived at least a plurality of the popular vote; but in 1876 the devia- 






12 


The Twelfth Amendment, 


tion of the Electoral result from the popular vote was so great that a 
person receiving an actual majority of the popular vote failed of an 
election according to the forms of law. 

As frequent reference must be had to the returns of the election 
of 1876, I here insert a tabular statement of the popular vote, which 
I believe to be generally correct—at least so nearly so as to meet all 
practical requirements. The Electoral count is that officially de¬ 
clared before the two Houses of Congress: 




The Twelfth AmevchnenL 


IS 


TABLE A. 

POPULAR AND ELECTORAL VOTES OF 1876. 


j ELECTORS. 


STATES. 

CO 

o> 

eS 

a 

<o 

2 

EH 

2 

o 

Eh 

Hayes. I 

THE PO 

Tilden. 

PULAR \ 

Coop’r 

r OTE. 

Smith. 

Total. 

Alabama .... 


10 

10 

68,320 

106,213 



174 £193 

Arkansas.... 


6 

6 

38,669 

58,033 

211 


96 913 

California. 

6 


6 

78,614 

75,855 

44 


154 243 

Colorado . 

3 


3 

14,154 

13,316 



27,470 

Connecticut... 


6 

G 

59,034 

61,934 

744 

378 

122,090 

Delaware. 


3 

3 

10,G91 

13,379 



24,070 

Florida. 

4 


4 

23,849 

22,923 



46,772 

Georgia. 


ii 

11 

49,354 

129,785 



179 139 

Illinois. 

21 


21 

278,232 

258,601 

18,P21 

437 

-L I t/jJL. fJtJ 

555,690 

Indiana. 


is 

15 

208,111 

213,526 

9,533 


431,170 

Iowa. 

11 


11 

171,826 

112,099 

9,001 

36 

292,693 

Kansas. 

5 

- . . 

5 

78,332 

37,902 

7.776 

133 

124,143 

Kentucky.... 

... 

12 

12 

97,490 

150,108 

2,003 

898 

250,499 

Louisiana. 

8 


8 

95,135! 

70,556 



165,691 

Maine. 

7 


7 

66,300! 

49,914 

663 


116^877 

Maryland. 


8 

8 

71,891 

91,780 



163 671 

Massachus’tts 

13 


13 

150,078 

108,975! 

873 


259,926 

Michigan 

11 

- - 

11 

166,534 

141,190! 

9,060 

839 

317,623 

Minnesota ... 

5 

- - . 

5 

72,692 

48,799 

2,389 


123,880 

Mississippi... 


8 

8 

51,853 

108,241 



160,094 

Missouri. 


15 

15 

145,029 

207,077 

3,492 

277 

355 875 

Nebraska. 

3 


3 

31,915 

17,554! 

2,320 

1,599- 

53,388 

Nevada. 

3 


3 

10,286 

9,196 



19,482 

N. Hampshire 

5 


5 

41,522 

38,440 

76 


80,038 

New Jersey.. 


9 

9 

103,507 

115,956 

712 

43 

220,218 

New York. . 


35 

35 

489,505 

522,043 

2,039 

2,359 

1,015.946 

N. Carolina.. 


10 

10 

106,402 

122,580 


228,982 

Ohio. 

22 

: 

22 

330,689 

323,182 

3,057 

1,712 

658,640 

Oregon. 

3 

- ... 

3 

15,414 

14,157 

510 

4 

30,085 

Pennsylvania. 

29 

... 

29 

384,184 

366,204 

7,204 

1,401 

758,993 

Rhode Island 

4 


4 

15,787 

10,712 

60 


26,559 

S. Carolina... 

7 


7 

91,870 

90,906 



182,776 

Tennessee . 


12 

12 

89,566 

133,166 

1 ------ 


222,732 

Texas. 


8 

8 

44,552 

103,613 



148,165 

Vermont 

5 


5 

44,091 

20,354 



64,445 

Virginia. 


11 

11 

95,595 

139,670 



235,265 

W. Virginia.. 


5 

5 

42,698 

56,455 

1,373 


100,526 

Wisconsin ... 

’lb 


10 

130,070 

123,690 

1,809 

32 

255,601 

Total.. 

185 

184 

369 

4,063,842 

4,287,814 

83,370 

10,148 

8,445,174 















































































n 


The Twelfth Amendment. 


Whether the returns of the popular vote, given above, are as ex¬ 
actly correct or not is wholly immaterial, and admitting, for the sake 
of argument, that they are not so, I may, nevertheless, base all my 
conclusions upon them with entire safety, for they prove the possi¬ 
bility of such a result at any time in a close contest, with a system like 
that now in vogue; indeed, under any system, except the popular 
vote plan, a person m^y receive a majority of the votes of the 
people, and still fail of an election. Of this I do not complain; my 
objections to the Electoral system are based upon other considera¬ 
tions; but of these more hereafter. 

By the returns of 1876, I find the whole popular vote to have been 
8,445,174, of which Hayes received 4,063,842, Tilden 4,287,814, 
Cooper 83,370, Smith 10,148, Tilden over Hayes, 223,972; Tilden 
over all. 130,454; yet Hayes was elected. The returns might have 
shown a much larger majority for Tilden, without any change in the 
general result. Suppose that 1500 in California, 9000 in Illinois, 
29,000 in Iowa, and 20,000 in Kansas, had been taken from Hayes 
and given to Tilden- the result would have been the same; and 
changes of less magnitude in other Hayes States might have been 
made, with increased majorities for Tilden in the States which he 
carried, so as to give him an excess over Hayes of a million popu¬ 
lar votes, and still the final result would have been unchanged. 

With the possibility of a person being elected President without 
receiving a popular majority, why, it may be asked, was the Electoral 
system adopted ? I answer that it was to satisfy what many of the 
ablest and wisest statesmen regard as a just demand of the small 
States for a greater relative influence than the large States in the 
election of Presidents and Vice Presidents. The small States de¬ 
manded and obtained an equal representation with the large States 
in the Senate, and it is expressly declared in the Constitution that no 
State shall be deprived of an equal representation in the Senate with¬ 
out its consent. Without these concessions, the Union could not 
have been formed; and shall the very principle upon which the 
Union stands be disregarded now? In addition to what has been 
said, I will assert, without fear of successful contradiction, that 
the United States Government is one of limited powers. The 
Tenth Amendment declares that “the powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 



The Twelfth Amendment. 


15 


States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people/’ 
Who delegated the powers above referred to ? Certainly not the 
people of the United States as one community, but the people of the 
States respectively, and they are the people referred to wherever the 
people are mentioned in the Constitution. Indeed, the people of the 
United States, as one community, exercise no control whatever over 
the government of the United States. They can only be heard 
through their respective State organizations. The preamble to the 
Constitution says: “We, the people of the United States, in order to 
form a more perfect Union, * * * * do ordain and establish 

this Constitution,” etc. In accordance with the sentiment of the 
framers of the Constitution, it was proposed to insert the names of 
the States in the preamble, so as to make it read something like this : 
“The States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,” etc., etc., “do ordain 
and establish this Constitution,” but the objection to this phraseology 
was that possibly all the States of the old Confederation might not 
accede to the Union at all, and so the present form was adopted. 

Article I, section 1, declares that “the House of Representatives 
shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the 
people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have 
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch 
of the State Legislature.” Thus are the States to determine, each for 
itself, what shall be the qualifications of voters for Representatives 
in Congress. The “people” are mentioned, also, in the First Amend¬ 
ment, which declares that “Congress shall make no law * * * 

abridging * * * the right of the people peaceably to assemble,” 

etc.; the Second Amendment declares that “a well regulated militia 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;” the Fourth Amend¬ 
ment says “the right of the people to be secure in their persons * * 
shall not be violated;” and the Ninth Amendment is in these words 
of weighty import: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people.” What people were referred to in these several amend¬ 
ments? By any fair construction, and by necessary implication, the 
people of the several States were so referred to. 

No law can be found which gives the people of the United States 
any authority in the administration of the Federal Government ex- 






The Twelfth Amendment. 


16 


cept through their respective State organizations, and only in the 
Lower House of Congress is representation based upon population, 
and the members of that body are chosen from districts formed and 
controlled by State authority. In the House “all bills for raising rev¬ 
enue must originate, but the Senate may propose or concur with 
amendments as on other bills;” and the House has “the sole power 
of impeachment.” In these only the people, through the House of 
Representatives, have the advantage. But look at the Senate, and 
see how far its powers exceed those of the House. In effect, no law 
has ever passed Congress without the sanction of the States, through 
the equal representation of each in the Senate; the Senate rejects or 
confirms all nominations of Cabinet officers, Foreign Ministers, Judges 
of the United States Courts, and other high officers; it rejects or rati¬ 
fies treaties with foreign powers; and by the Senate all civil officers, 
even Judges of the Supreme Court or the President himself, may be 
removed from office on impeachment, and from its decision in such 
cases there is no appeal.* It will be seen, then, that the people ex¬ 
ercise no control over the government except through their State 
organizations, and only in the House is there anything like equality, 
and that body has no power whatever over the vast interests before 

^Senator Sumner, in his opinion on the impeachment trial of President Johnson, 
used this language: “Something has been said of the people, now watching our 
proceedings with patriotic solicitude, and it has been proclaimed that they are 
wrong to intrude their judgment. I do not think so. This is a political proceed¬ 
ing, which the people at this moment are as competent' to decide as the Senate.” 
On this historic occasion, when the States, through their Senators, exercised the 
very highest functions, and the most momentous issues were involved, all the Sen¬ 
ators from California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp¬ 
shire. New Jersey, New York. Ohio, Oregon. Rhode Island and Vermont, with a, 
population of 12,278,383 in 1870 (say 12, oi o.ooo at the time of the impeachment trial, 
1808) voted the President guilty. Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland and Tennessee, 
with a population of about 3,000.000 in 1868, voted that he was not guilty as charged 
in the articles of impeachment. In Connecticut, Illinois. Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Wisconsin, with 
a population of about H.ooo.ooo people in 1808 , the Senators were divided—one 
off-setting the other in each State. The population of the twenty-seven States then 
having Senators in Congress was about 29 , 00000 . Adding half the popouiation of the 
States that divided their votes to one side and one-half to the other, and the count 
would stand: guilty, I9,ooo,ooo; hot guilty, 10 , 000 . 000 . Yet the President was acquit¬ 
ted. In fact, the States of Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas. Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin, with a population of 
about 2,500.000, could have prevented the removal of the President, even though all 
l he other States, with 20,500,000 of population, had voted him guilty. Hence, it 
will be seen that the States, and not the people at large, decide questioas of the 
g re a test mag n i t u de. 













I 


The Twelfth Amendment. 


17 


mentioned, they being confided exclusively to the Senate, in which 
each State, without regard to population, wealth or resources, has an 
equal voice. In order, therefore, that the Constitution might har¬ 
monize in all its provisions, a system of electing the President and 
Vice President was adopted whereby State equality and the popular 
voice were so adjusted that neither should unwarrantably encroach 
upon the other; but, for reasons already given and to be given here¬ 
after, the system has failed. The main principle upon which it was 
founded, however, is eminently correct. It was a compromise be¬ 
tween two extremes—one insisting upon an equal voice by each 
State, the other contending for an election by popular vote. Thus 
was the Electoral system adopted. That it has failed is not because 
it gives the small States a greater relative influence in the election 
of Presidents than the large States : in this is found its great virtue. 

No two States exercise the same relative influence in electing the 
President, as will be seen by the following table, based upon the re¬ 
turns for 1876, showing the ratio of each State (which is found by 
dividing the number of popular votes in a State by its Electoral 
vote); the per cents of the popular and Electoral votes, and the gain 
or loss to each State by the Electoral system instead of the popular 
vote : 

TABLE B. 

RATIO AND PER CENT. 


STATE RATIO OF POPULAR VOTES TO ONE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR. 

Per Cent 
Pop. Vote. 

Per Cent 
Elec. Vote 

1 

Gain. 

CO 

co 

O 

l-l 

Alabama. 

.17,453 

2.06 

2.71 

24.00 


Arkansas. 

...16,152 

1.14 

1.62 

29.63 


California. 

.25,707 

1.82 

1.62 

. 

12.34 

Colorado. 


0.32 

0.81 

60.49 


Connecticut.. 

.20,348 

1.44 

1.62 

11.11 


Delaware.. 

. 8,023 

0.28 

0.81 

65.43 

. 

Florida. 

.11,693 

0.55 

1.08 

49.07 


Georgia. 

.16,285 

2.12 

2.98 

28.92 


Illinois. 

.26,461 

6.57 

5.69 


15.46 

Indiana. 

.28,745 

5.15 

4.06 


26.84 

Iowa. 

.26,633 

3.46 

2.98 


16.11 

Kansas. 

.24,829 

1.47 

1.35 


8.98. 

Kentucky. 

.20,875 

2.97 

3.25 

' 8.61 


Louisiana. 

..20,711 

1.96 

2.16 

9.45 

tiol 1< Ml 


3 






































18 


The Twelfth Amendment 


Table B—Continued. 


STATE RATIO OF POPULAR VOTES TO ONE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR. 

Per Cent 

1 Pop. Vote. 

Per Cent 
Elac. Vote 

Gain. 

Loss. 

Maine. 

.16,697 

1.38 

1.89 

27.00 


Maryland. 

.20,459 

1.94 

2.16 

10.18 


Massachusetts. 

.19,994 

3.04 

3.51 

13.39 


Michigan. 

.28,875 

3.76 

2.98 

. 

26.17 

Minnesota. 

.24,776 

1.46 

1.35 


8.15 

Mississippi. 

.20,012 

1.89 

2.16 

12.50 


Missouri. 

.23,725 

4.21 

4.06 

. 

3.56 

Nebraska. 

.17,796 

0.63 

0.81 

22.22 


Nevada. 

. 6,494 

0.23 

0.81 

71.60 


New Hampshire. 

..16,007 

0.94 

1.35 

30.37 


New Jersey. 

.23,357 

3.61 

2.44 

- • - ... 

6.96 

New York. 

.29,027 

12.04 

9.48 


27.00 

North Carolina. 

.22,898 

2.71 

2.71 

. 


Ohio. 

.29,919 

7.82 

5.96 


31.20 

Oregon. 

.10,028 

0.25 

0.81 

56.79 


Pennsylvania. 

.26,174 

8.91 

7.85 

. 

13.50 

Rhode Island. 

. 6,640 

0.31 

1.08 

71.29 

. 

South Carolina. 

..26,111 

2.16 

1.89 


14.18 

Tennessee. 

.18,561 

2.64 

3.25 

18.77 


Texas. 

..... .18.521 

1.52 

2.16 

29.63 


Vermont. 

.12,889 

0.76 

1.35 

43.70 


Virginia. 

.21,388 

2.71 

2.98 

9.06 


"West Virginia. 

.,20,105 

1.19 

1.35 

11.85 


Wisconsin. 

.25,560 

3.03 

2.71 


11.80 


The per cent of the popular vote will vary with each election; the 
per cent of the Electoral vote every ten years. At the late election 
Nevada threw the least number of popular votes; New York the 
greatest. New York cast over fifty-two times as many popular votes 
as Nevada, but not twelve times as many Electoral votes. Rhode 
Island exercised the greatest relative influence in the election of 
1876; Ohio the least. Ohio cast over twenty-four times as many 
popular votes as Rhode Island, but only five and a-half times as many 
Electoral votes. 

The average gain in eleven Hayes States was 41.4 per cent; aver¬ 
age loss in ten Hayes States, 15.8 per cent. Average gain in twelve 
Tilden States, 21.64 per cent; average loss in four Tilden States, 
16.09 per cent. One Tilden State (North Carolina) neither gained 
nor lost. 





















































Election by Popular Vote. 


io 


ELECTION BY POPULAR VOTE. 


I feel certain that the proposition to elect the President by the 
votes of the people of all the States as one community would be 
rejected—each State having an equal voice in the ratification or re¬ 
jection of a constitutional amendment, and three-fourths of the 
States being necessary to secure ratification. Nevertheless, a few 
facts bearing upon this branch of the subject cannot be out of place. 
The great danger to he apprehended from the popular vote theory 
is that one group of States may combine and overpower all the 
other States. That this danger is not without some foundation, the 
facts to be submitted will abundantly prove. Take the eight States 
of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, ‘Wis¬ 
consin and Iowa, all composed of contiguous territory, as an illus¬ 
tration. I find that in 1876 they cast 4,286,527 popular votes—a ma¬ 
jority of 63,490 over all the other States; in these eight States Hayes 
received over 53 per cent of his popular vote, and over 56 per cent 
of his Electoral vote. These States have— 


Of popular votes.over 50.80 per cent 

Of Senators in Congress.over 20.05 per cent 

Of Representatives in Congress.nearly 47.10 per cent 

Of Electors under the present law, or Presidential 
votes under qither the Buckalew plan or the True 

Method.41.47 per cent 

Add Missouri to the list, and the nine States have— 

Of popular votes.nearly 55.03 per cent 

Of Senators in Congress.over 23.68 per cent 

Of Representatives in Congress...over 51.52 per cent 

Of Electors.nearly 45.81 per cent 

Bring in Massachusetts, and the ten Stated have— 

Of popular votes.over 58.14 per cent 

Of Senators in Congress.over 26.31 per cent 

Of Representatives in Congress.over 55.29 per cent 

Of Electors *..over 49.32 per cent 

Adding Maryland, and the eleven States, all composed of con¬ 
tiguous territory, have— 

Of popular votes..over 60.05 per cent 

Of Senators in Congress.... over 29.00 per cent 

Of Representatives in Congress.nearly 57.34 per cent 

Of Electors.nearly 51.52 per cent 

In these eleven States Hayes received nearly 62 per cent of the 
Electoral vote. 


Further to illustrate the great difference between the popular vote 
theory and any system which gives, the small States greater relative 
influence than those of greater voting power, the several States are 
placed in groups, in the order of their heaviest popular vote in 1876 
together with the number of Electors to which each, is now ntitled ; 























Election by Popular Vote. 


$0 


GiiOUP I. Electors. 

GiiOUP 11. Electors. 

GiiOUP III, Electors. 

1 New York.... 

..35 

13 North Carolina. 

..10 

26 Connecticut .... 

6 

2 Pennsylvania . 

..29 

14 Tennessee . ... 

..12 

27 Maine. 

7 

3 Ohio .. 

..22 

15 New Jersey ... 

.. 9 

28 West Virginia... 

5 

4 Illinois. 

..21 

16 South Carolina. 

,. 7 

29 Arkansas. 

6 

5 Indiana. 

..15 

17 Georgia. 

.11 

30 N. Hampshire ... 

5 

6 Missouri. 

..15 

18 Alabama. 

..10 

31 Vermont. 

5 

7 Michigan_ 

..11 

19 Louisiana. 

. 8 

32 Nebraska. 

3 

8 Iowa.. 

..11 

20 Maryland. 

. 8 

33 Florida. 

4 

9 Massachusetts 

..13 

21 Mississippi ... 

.. 8 

34 Oregon. 

3 

10 Wisconsin .... 

..10 

22 California. 

. 6 

35 Colorado. 

3 

11 Kentucky .... 

..12 

23 Texas. 

. 8 

36 Khode Island... 

4 

12 Virginia.. 

.11 

24 Kansas. 

. 5 

37 Delaware. 

3 



25 Minnesota .... 

. 5 

38 Nevada. 

3 

Total. 

.205 

Total. 

107 

Total. ..57 

Pop. vote, 5,^7,921. 

Pop. vote, 2,348,540. 

Pop. vote, 808,713. 



Should the popular vote theory be adopted, the voting power of 
the first group would be raised from 55.55 to 62.61—a difference 
in favor of the large States of 12.7 per c^nt. The strength of the 
second group would be reduced from 29.00 to 27.64, entailing a loss 
of 4.07 per cent. The voting power of the third groupe would be 
reduced from 15.44 to 9.57, and a loss of over 38 per cent would be 
the result. The States in the third groupe have twenty-six of the 
seventy-six Senators, and by voting in unison could defeat any pro¬ 
posed amendment in the Senate, a two-third vote being necessary. 
The ten States least in voting power, from Arkansas to Nevada, both 
inclusive, have 10.57 per cent of the Electors and 5.48 per cent of 
the popular vote. Therefore, in an election by popular vote, their 
voting power would be reduced 48.15 per cent; yet these ten States, 
either by non-action or adverse action, may defeat the ratification of 
any amendment submitted by Congress to the States, as an amend¬ 
ment must be ratified by three-fourths of all the States before it can 
become a part of the Constitution. 

I find, also, that the six New England States, together with New 
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Iowa and Minnesota, all composed of contiguous territory, cast 
5,080,472 votes in 1876; the other Stages 3,364,702. A million ma¬ 
jority for one person in those States would not be relatively greater 
than*the majority for Hayes in Kansas, Khode Island or Vermont, or 
for Tilden in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky or Mississippi. 
A million plurality in the New England States, together with New 
York, Pennsylvania, etc., would be equal to five hundred and ninety- 







































I 


The Tuckalew Plan. b 2l 


eight in every one thousand votes, while it would require in the other 
States six hundred and fifty in every one thousand votes to over¬ 
come it. It may be said that there is no danger, under such circum¬ 
stances, of a combination between those States in order to control a 
Presidential election. How that might be, if the election was sub¬ 
mitted to popular vote, I cannot say; I do know that in three of the 
Presidential elections held since 1860 these fifteen States, beginning 
with Maine and extending south and west to and including Iowa, 
gave pluralities for the same person at each election. Improbable as 
any such combination may appear, it is yet more improbable that 
New Jersey and Texas, or Delaware and Nevada, or North Carolina 
and Nebraska, or Arkansas and California, or Louisiana and Oregon, 
would or could form a combination, even in mutual sef-defense, 
against States all composed of contiguous territory. Furthermore, 
the election by popular vote would deprive the small States of that 
preponderating influence in Presidential elections without which the 
Union could never have been formed. It is at war with the whole 
theory upon which the Federal Government is founded, and the 
adoption of the popular vote plan would be the most dangerous 
step in the direction of centralization that the country has yet -wit¬ 
nessed. (The question will be referred to again.) 

THE BUCKALEW PLAN. 

“The plan of electing a President advocated by Mr. Buckalew, of 
Pennsylvania,” says the Missouri Bepublican, “does away with the 
Electors, and provides that the people shall vote directly for Presi¬ 
dential candidates. The States will not have Electors, but will have 
Electoral votes—each as many as the number of its Representatives 
and Senators in Congress; but, instead of all those votes being cast for 
that candidate who shall carry the State, they are to be divided be¬ 
tween the two or more. candidates in proportion to the number of 
popular votes they shall receive, respectively. * * * * For ex _ 

ample, in the late Presidential election, Missouri voted 203,077 for 
Tilden 145,029 for Hayes, Tilden’s majority being 58,048, and all the 
fifteen votes of Missouri, therefore, being awarded to him. * * * 

Under the Buckalew proposition, the aggregate Presidential vote of 
Missouri, 348,106, would be divided by fifteen, the number of Elec¬ 
toral votes the State is entitled to, and the resulting number, 23,207, 
would be the Electoral ratio for the State. Dividing Tilden’s popu¬ 
lar vote (203,077) by this would give eight ratios and more than 
a half over, and the scheme provides that when the fraction of a 
ratio is more than half it shall count one. Tilden, therefore, would 
receive nine of the Electoral votes of Missouri and Hayes six,” 








The Buckalew Plan. 


This is the gist of the proposition, so far as developed in the Re¬ 
publican’s article, and pursuant thereto I have made up a tabular 
statement (based upon the returns of 1876) showing what the Presi¬ 
dential result would have been under the Buckalew plan, viz. : 

Table C — The Result of 1876 under the Buckalew Plan. 


STATES. 


Alabama. 

Arkansas.. 

California. 

Colorado. 

Connecticut ... 

Delaware. 

Florida. 

Georgia. 

Illinois. 

Indiana. 

Iowa. 

Kansas. 

Kentucky. 

Louisiana. 

Maine. 

Maryland. 

Massachusetts .. 

Michigan. 

Minnesota. 

Mississippi. 

Missouri. 

Nebraska. 

Nevada. 

New Hampshire 
New Jersey .... 

New York. 

North Carolina. 

Ohio.. 

Oregon . 

Pennsylvania.... 
Rhode Island ... 
South Carolina .. 

Tennessee. 

Texas. 

Vermont. 

Virginia. 

West Virginia.... 
Wisconsin. 

Total. 


Total 
Pop. Vote 

PLUIU 

LLITIES. 

Hayes. 

Tilden. 

. 174,532 

i. 

37,893 

19,364 

i . 

96,912 


. 154,243 

: 3,02S 
» 838 

i 

» 27,470 


. 122,090 

2,900 

2,678 

. 24,070 


. 46,772 

926 

179,139 

80,521 

555,691 

19,631 

431,170 

202,963 

124,143 

5,415 

59,728 

41,430 


250,499 

165,691 

52,618 

24,579 

16,386 

116,877 


163,761 

259,926 

19,799 

41,103 

25,444 

23,893 

317,623 


. 123,880 


160,094 

56,288 

355,875 


58,048 

53,388 

14,361 

1,080 

19,482 


80,038 

2,082 


220,218 

12,499 

1,015,946 

228,982 


32,538 

16,178 


658,640 

7,507 

30,085 

1,257 


758,993 

17,980 


26,559 

5,085 


182,776 

984 


222,732 


43,600 

148,165 


59,061 

64,445 

23,737 

235,265 

44,075 

13,577 

100,526 


255,601 

6,386 

8,445,174 

| 

1! 


4 
2 
3 
2 
3 , 
1 
2 
3 

11 

7 

7 

3 

5 

5 

4 
4 

8 

6 
3 
3 
6 
2 
2 

3 

4 
17 

5 

11 

2 

15 

2 

4 

5 
2 

3 

4 
2 

5 


6 

4 

3 

1 

3 
2 
2 
8 

10 

8 

4 
2 
7 
3 

3 

4 

5 
5 
2 
5 
9 
1 
1 
2 
5 

18 

5 

11 

1 

14 

2 

3 

7 

6 
2 
7 
3 
5 


180 189 













































































































The Buckalew Plan. 


23 


The footing up shows a close approximation to the true result, but 
that this is owing to fortuitous circumstances rather than to perfection 
in the Buckalew plan, I undertake to make apparent to any one who 
will follow me in the investigation. 

REMARKS ON THE BUCKALEW PLAN. 

I. Illinois gave Hayes 278,232, Tilden 258,601, Cooper 18,421, 
Smith 437—total, 555,691; ratio, 26,461. Dividing Hayes’ vote by 
the ratio, I find him entitled to ten Presidential votes, with 13,522 
popular votes over, which is 287 more than half the ratio, and gives 
him another vote. Tilden scores ten votes by allowing him one for 
his fraction of 22,315—more than 9,000 over half the ratio. In 
effect, then, 287 popular votes gave Hayes an extra Presidential vote, 
while over 9,000 cast for Tilden were of no avail whatever. How¬ 
ever, as Hayes led Tilden nearly 20,000, the apportionment of eleven 
to ten is a fair one. But suppose Hayes had received 300 popular 
votes less than he did, so as to leave his fraction below half a ratio, 
he could then have counted only ten to Tilden’s ten, though still 
ahead of him 19,000 or 20,000. What would become of the odd vote 
in that case ? Should it go to Hayes, when Cooper received more 
votes than Hayes’ fraction amounted to ? 

II. Indiana gave Hayes 208,111, Tilden 213,536, Cooper 933— 
total, 431,170; ratio, 28,744. Hayes is entitled to seven votes, with 
6,903 over; Tilden seven, with 12,318 over. Neither Hayes nor Til¬ 
den having a fraction equal to half a ratio, what is to be done with 
the odd vote ? I suppose Tilden has the best right to it. 

III. Iowa gave Hayes 171,827, Tildeft 112,099, Cooper 9,001, 
Smith 36. Hayes gets six votes, with a fraction over of 12,029, which 
is less than half a ratio. Tilden is entitled to four votes without dis¬ 
pute; but an extra vote must be given to Hayes in order to “force” a 
balance. Indiana and Iowa are parallel cases, and one happily off¬ 
sets the other; but suppose the plurality in each State had been 
in favor of the same person, and the general result had depended on 
those two States, what then? Would not such a contingency lead to 
a serious complication ? 

IV. Kansas gave Hayes 78,332, Tilden 39,902, Cooper and Smith 
7,809—total, 124,143; ratio, 24,826. Hayes scores three, with 3,844 
popular Aotss thrown away. Tilden gets two votes, one being 
allowed fc r a fraction of 663 more than half a ratio. Hayes gets 







n 


The BucJcalew Plan. 


nearly two to one over Tilden in popular votes, but only three to his 
two on the Presidential count. 

Y. Maryland is a most anomalous case. Hayes received 71,981 
to 91,780 for Tilden—total, 163,761; ratio, 20,470. Hayes gets three 
votes, with an extra one for a fraction of 10,571, which is 336 more 
than half a ratio. Only four votes remain for Tilden, although he 
ran nearly 20,000 ahead of Hayes. Such a result may not often be 
obtained, but a system which admits of it in any case is certainly at 
fault. 

VI. Massachusetts gave^ Hayes 150,078, Tilden 108,975, Cooper 
873—total, 259,926. Hayes gets eight votes by allowing him one for 
a fraction of 10,120 (the ratio being 19,994), only 123 more than 
half the ratio. Tilden gets five votes, but over 9,000 of his popular 
votes are of no avail. Had 150 of Hayes’ votes gone over to Cooper 
or Smith, so as to reduce Hayes’ fraction below half a ratio, it w T ould 
have presented another Indiana or Iowa case, and a “forced” balance 
would have become necessary. 

VII. Nebraska is another anomaly. Hayes had 31,915, Tilden 
17,754, Cooper and Smith 3,919—total, 53,588; ratio, 17,862. Hayes 
gets two votes, by allowing him one for a fraction nearly up to the 
full ratio. But who shall have the other Presidential vote, Tilden’s 
pojmlar vote being less than the ratio ? If it should go to Tilden, 
his fraction being the largest, why not allow Cooper a vote in Illi¬ 
nois, where he received a larger popular vote than, the fraction for 
either Tilden or Hayes? In order to balance the account, the odd 
vote is awarded to Tilden. 

VIII. North Carolina presents a like case to Maryland. Hayes 
gets five votes, one being allowed for a fraction of 14,820,- being 
3,471 more than half the ratio. The total vote of the State was 
106,402 for Hayes and 122,580 for Tilden, whose majority is 16,178; 
but only five votes remain for him. 

IX. Ohio makes a happy off-set to North Carolina; but suppose 
the pluralities were in favor of the same person, and the general re¬ 
sult hinged on those two States, what then ? Ohio gave Hayes 330,- 
689, Tilden 323,182, and others 4,769—total, 658,640; ratio, 29,938. 
Hayes gets eleven votes, his fraction being only 1,309 over half a 
ratio, while Tilden gets eleven, one being added for his fraction. 

X. Rhode Island gave Hayes 15,787, Tilden 10,712, Cooper 60— 
total, 26,559; ratio, 6,640. Hayes gets two Presidential votes, with 



The Buckalew Plan. 


25 


2,507 popular votes thrown away; Tilden two, by allowing him an 
extra vote for his fraction of 752 over half the ratio. Hayes gets over 
fifty-nine per cent of the popular vote, but only fifty per cent of the 
Presidential vote. 

XI. In South Carolina Hayes gets 52.26 per cent of the popular 
vote, and 59.14 per cent of the Presidential vote. 

XII. Vermont is an off-set to South Carolina, Hayes getting 68.5 
per cent of the popular vote, and only sixty per cent of the Presi¬ 
dential vote. But suppose one did not offset the other ; in that case 
the rule would not work out a proper result. 

XIII. Virginia gave Hayes 95,595, Tilden 139,670—total, 235,- 
265; ratio, 21,387. Hayes scores four Presidential votes, with 10,047 
popular votes over, it being 597 below half the ratio. Tilden scores 
seven by allowing him one extra vote for a fraction only 744 over 
half the ratio. Four hundred popular votes taken from Tilden and 
given to Hayes would have given the latter another Presidential vote, 

XTV. Wisconsin gave Hayes 6,140 more popular votes than Til¬ 
den, but the Presidential vote is five to live. 

Notwithstanding these discrepancies, the Buckalew plan works out 
a fair result, but that such a result was due to mere chance I under¬ 
take to establish conclusively. According to the returns of 1876, the 
States of California, Florida, Ohio, Bhode Island and Wisconsin gave 
Hayes pluralities of 24,017 over Tilden on the popular vote, and each 
receives, under the Buckalew plan, twenty-three Presidential votea 
Connecticut, Maryland and North Carolina gave Tilden pluralities of 
38,878 over Hayes, and each has twelve Presidential votes. Tilden 
being only 14,860 ahead in these eight States, he suffers no great 
loss by the apportionment of thirty-five Presidential votes to each. 
But, had all the pluralities been in Tilden’s favor, his excess of pop¬ 
ular votes would have been 62,994, and the Buckalew plan would 
have worked out the same Presidential result; though an adjustment 
under the True Method would foot up about thirty-six for Tilden to 
thirty-four for Hayes—a difference quite sufficient to change the gen¬ 
eral result where parties are nearly divided evenly. 

Assuming the popular vote to have been as follows in the thirteen 
States below mentioned, the Presidential result under the Buckalew 
plan would have been sixty to sixty ; 

4 







The BucJcalew Plan. 


9M 


TABLE T3. 

SHOWING THE RESULT OX ASSUMED RETURNS. 


STATES. 


Alabama 


Florida 


Louisiana. 

Maryland. 

North Carolina.. 

Ohio... . 

Rhode Island.. 

Tennessee .. 

Texas.. 

Wisconsin. ... j 115,101 

Total.. 


Hayes. 

Tilden. ' 

Hayes’ 

' Majority. 

Tilden’s 

Majority. 

I 95 965 

78,568 

65,5331 

17,397 

24,467 


89,000 


71,200 

50,890! 

20,110 


29,170 

17,602; 

11,568 


114,849| 

135,650 


20,801 

72,547 j 

93,144 


20,597 

92,080! 

71,681 

20,399 


103,082 

125,900 


22,818 

j 344,218 

314,422 

29,796 


1 16,580 

9,980 

6,600 


.! 102,166 

120,566 

18,400 

. 68,881 

83,284 


18,403 

. j 115,101 

140,500! 


25,399 


120,337 


Tilden’s majority in the thirteen States. 


120,418 

120,337 

6,081 


In an even apportionment of the Presidential vote, Tilden’s loss on 
popular votes is only the trifle of 6,081. But suppose all these pop¬ 
ular majories had been for Tilden: then his excess would have been 
246,765; and the Buckalew plan would have worked out the same 
Presidential result. Under the True Method this majority of 246,- 
765 for Tilden would give him sixty-six to fifty-four for Hayes. If 
this does not prove the Buckalew plan to be impracticable, then I 
fail to comprehend clearly what an impracticability actually is, 











































V ? 


V» ty,. •nrf ■ 




THE TRUE METHOD. 


I will next take into consideration, and explain fully and in detail 
the design and purposes of 

THE TRITE METHOD. 

Since, therefore, the Electoral system has failed, and the popular 
vote theory is at variance with the cherished principle of State 
equality upon which the Federal Government is founded, while Mr 
Buckalews plan, although it is an improvement, cannot be made to 
adjust the Presidential vote to the popular vote in many cases, with 
even approximate fairness, how is the difficulty to be met ? Although 
1 use the word “difficulty,” there is really nothing difficult about it. 
By the plan I propose, the adjustment of the Presidential vote to 
the popular vote of Hayes and Tilden, respectively, does not vary as 
much as ten popular votes except in one State. This is not exact, I am 
well aware; but many things are accepted as correct which in reality 
are not so. If A invest $'29 in business, B $26 and C $33, and they 
gain $19, what is each man's pro rata share of the gain V The sum 
of the investments is $88. Hence, multiplying each man's invest¬ 
ment by nineteen, and dividing the quotient by eighty eight, gives A 
$6.26, B $5.61 and G $7.12, which sums, added togethei 4 , foot up 
$18.99—very near, but not exactly, the true answer. If, therefore, a 
variation is found in a matter involving less than one hundred dol¬ 
lars, does not the True Method, which so nearly approaches exact¬ 
ness where such vast interests are at stake, commend itself to gen¬ 
eral favor? 

Following the' Electoral system and the Buckalew plan, the True 
Method provides for Presidential votes for the several States, each 
to have a number equal to all its Senators and Representatives in 
Congress; but the True Method excels either in this: that it adjusts 





The True Method. 


the Presidential vote to the popular vote of each person voted for 
with such close approximation to absolute exactness as to meet all 
practical requirements. The deviations are in cases where the popu¬ 
lar vote is so inconsiderable as that for Smith in Oregon; and, after 
adjusting the Presidential to the popular vote, the*odd thousandths 
of a Presidential vote (which in no case can exceed nine) are added 
to the quota of the person receiving the highest popular vote in the 
State, except where two or more persons have an equal and the great¬ 
est number of popular votes, and then the fraction is to *be divided 
equally between them. 

The True Method is so simple and practical that I am surprised 
to find that it has not been sooner suggested by some of the writers 
who have given the subject attention. It is based upon the rule used in 
the supposed case of A, B and C, a rule with which the merest tyro in 
mathematics ought to be familiar. Apply that rule to the popular 
and Presidential votes of Iowa, as an illustration : Hayes had 171,- 
827, Tilden 112,099, Cooper 9,001, Smith 36—total, 292,963, which 
latter sum represents the amount of all the investments. The Presi¬ 
dential vote of the State is eleven, which represents the profit. Mul¬ 
tiply Hayes’ vote (171,827) by eleven, and divide the quotient by the 
total vote of the State (292,963), and the answer is 6.451, which is 
Hayes’ quota. In the same manner Tilden’s share is found to be 4.209, 
Cooper’s .337 and Smith’s ,001. These sums foot up 10.998, leaving 
a fraction of .002 (two-thousandths) to be added to Hayes’ share. 
By this process (basing all my calculations upon the popular vote of 
1876) the following tabular statement is made up : 



The True Method. 


m 


TABLE E. 

Presidential Result of 1876 Under the True Method. 



POPULAR VOTE. 

* ! 

PRESIDENTIAL 

VOTE. 

■ | 

STATES. | 









Hayes. | 

Tilden. | 

Cooper. 

Hayes, j 

Tilden. 

Coop’r 

Sm’h.l 

i 

Alabama ! 

68,320! 

106,213 


3 914! 

6.086 



Arkansas.. 

38,669; 

58,0331 

21li 

•2.394 

3.593 

.013 


California 

78,614 

75,855: 

44 

3.059! 

2.940 

.0011 


Colorado. 

14,154 

13,316; 


1.546; 

1.454 



Conn .... 

59,034 

61,934 

744| 

2.9001 

3.046 

.036 

.018 

Delaware 

10,691 

13,379 

. i 

1.3321 

1.668 



Florida .. 

23,849 

22,923 

...... j 

.1 

2.040 1 

1.960 



Georgia... 

49,354 

129,785 


3.0301 

7.970 



Illinois.... 

278,232 

258,601 

18,4*21 

10.516 

9.772 

.6961 

.016 

Indiana .. 

208,111 

213,526 

9,533 

7.2391 

7.430 

331! 


Iowa. 

171,826 

112,099 

9,001 

6.453i 

4.209: 

.337! 

.001 

Kansas .. 

78,332 

37,902 

7.776 

3.156 

1.5261 

.313! 

.005 

Kentucky 

97,490 

150,108 

2,003 

4.670 

7.192 

.095; 

.043 

Louisiana 

95,135 

70,556 

i 

4.594 

3.406 



Maine.... 

66,300 

49,914 

663 

3.972 

2.989 

.039 


Maryl’d .. 

71,891 

91,780 


3.516 

4.484 



Mass_ 

150,078 

108,975 

873 

7.507| 

5.450 

.043 


Michigan. 

166,534 

141,190 

9,060 

5.770 

4.889 

.313 

*028 

Minn .... 

72,692 

48.799 

2,389 

2.935! 

1.969 

.096 


Miss ..... 

51,853 

108.241 _ 

I 2.5911 

5.409 i _ 


Missouri. 

145,029 

207,077 

j 3,492 

i 6.112 

8.730 

.147 

.011 

Nebraska 

31,915 

17,554 

2,320! 1.795 

.986 

.130 

.089 

Nevada. .. 

10,286 

9,196 


1.584 

1.416 



N. Hamp. 

41,522 

38,440 

76! 2.595 

2.401 

,004 

.... 

N. Jersey. 

103,507 

115,956 

712 

1 4.230 

4.740 

.029 

,661 

N. York.. 

489,505 

522,043 

2,039 

16.863 

17.986 

.070 

.081! 

N. Car... 

106,402 

122,580 


4.646 

5.354 


! 

Ohio 

330,689 

323,182 

3,057 

11.047 

10.7941 .102 

.05?| 

Oregon... 

15,414 

14,157 

510 

1.539 

1.411 

.050 

.... 

Penn. 

384,184 

366,204 

7,204 

j 14.680 

13.992 

.275 

.053 

R. Island. 

15,787 

10,712 

60 

2.378 

! 1.613 

.009 

.... 

S. Car... 

[ 91,870 

90,906 


3.520 

j 3.480 



Tenn 

! 89,566 

133,166 

j * — - * 

i 4.825 

7.175 



Texas .. . 

1 44,552 

103,613 


2.405 

5.595 



Vermont.. 

j 44,091 

20,354 


3.421 

1.579 



Virginia . 

95*595 

139,670 


4.469 

6.531 



W. Virg .. 

42,698 

56,455 

1,373 

i 2.123 

2.809 

.068 

1 .... 

Wis. 

130,070 

123,690 

1,809 

; 5.090 

4.839 

.070 

j .001 

Total. 

4,063,842 

4,287,814 

83,370 

1175.356 

188.873 

3,267 

1 - 104 ! 


© 


10 

6 

6 

3 

6 

3 

4 
11 
21 
15 
11 

5 
12 

8 

7 

8 
13 
11 

5 

8 

15 

3 

3 

5 

9 

35 

10 

22 

3 

29 

4 

7 

12 

8 

5 
11 

5 

10 


369 


♦For Smith’s popular vote, see Table A 











































































so 


The True Method. 


The foregoing table shows how the Presidential vote of each can¬ 
didate would have footed up under the True Method. 

RESULTS COMPARED. 

Tilden's popular vote was 50.77 per cent and his Presidential vote 
51.18 per cent. Therefore, comparing the results of 1876 under the 
True Method with results under the Electoral system since 1844, I 
am enabled to make up the following tabular statement, conclusively 
demonstrating the superiority of the True Method over the Electoral 
system, viz.: 

Table F— Comparing Results. 



Per Cent i 

Pop. Vote] 

Per Cent, 
Elec.Vote * 1 Excess. 

1844—Polk. 

... - Electoral system 

49.56 

62.00! 

12.44 

1848—Taylor. 

- do. 

47.00 

56.00 

9.00 

1852—Pierce. 

- do. 

51.00 

85.00: 

34.00 

1856—Buchanan. 

_ do. 

45.00 

59.001 

14.00 

1860—Lincoln. 


39.57 

59.00 

19.43 

1864—Lincoln. 

_ do. 

55.00 

91.00! 

36.00 

1868—Grant. 


52.00 

73.00! 

21.00 

1872—Grant. 

_ do. 

55.00 

81.001 

26.00 

1876—Tilden.... 


50.77 

51.18 

00.41 


Taking into consideration these eight Presidential elections—1844 
to 1872—under the Electoral system, it will be seen that the devia¬ 
tion in one case (Lincoln in 1864) was as great as 36 per cent, 
while the nearest approach to exactness "was in 1848, when Taylor’s 
Electoral vote exceeded his popular vote nine per cent. Yet the 
True Method shows a deviation on Tilden’s vote of only forty-one- 
liundredths of one per cent, 

I find, also, that in 1840 Harrison received nearly eighty per cent 
of the Electoral vote, but only 52.88 per cent of the popular vote. 
Benton's Thirty Years’ View states that Van Buren received 364,000 
more popular votes in 1840 than he did in 1836. In 1836, when Van 
Buren received nearty 58 per cent of the Electoral vote, according 
to Benton’s work, he ran ahead of Harrison only 14,000 popular 
votes. In 1840 Van Buren suffered an overwhelming Electoral de¬ 
feat, receiving but little over one-fifth of that vote, yet receiving of 
the popular vote an excess of 364,000 over his vote in 1836. 

It should be remembered, also, that in 1852, when Pierce carried 
all but four of the States, and received 85 per cent of the Electoral 






















The True Method. 


SI 


vote, his majority was so overwhelming that the Whig party went 
down before such tremendous odds, never to rise again; yet of the 
popular vote he received only 51 per cent, showing that of every 
hundred votes cast by the people, 49 were Whigs. 

And in 1864, when the Republican party had all the immense pat¬ 
ronage of the Government to sustain it, the candidacy of McClellan 
was looked upon as simply farcical—a huge political joke. So it was, 
tested by the Electoral gauge; yet of the people forty-five of every 
hundred voted for him. 

With these examples before him, surely no man will claim that the 
Electoral system truly indicates the strength of parties in a Presi¬ 
dential contest. 

The following table shows the gains on the Presidential vote over 
the popular vote in each State by Tilden and Hayes respectively : 

Table G —Per Gents and Gains. 


Tilden States. 


Alabama. 

Arkansas. 

Connecticut ... 

Delaware. -_ 

Georgia.. 

Indiana.. 

Kentucky. 

Maryland. 

Mississippi 

Missouri. 

New Jersey- 

New York_ 

North Carolina. 

Tennessee. 

Texas. 

Virginia.. 

West Virginia .. 


Total 


Gains in 
Pop. 'Votes. 


1.458 

1.67 

7.886 

8.596 

1.379 

2.019 

1.669 

1.786 


OCo 


California. 

lorado . 
Florida _. 
Illinois ... 
Iowa .... 


3.437 

1.899 

1.940 

1.866 

5.020 

1.430 

1.684 

3.561 


Hayes States. 


> Louisiana. 

Maine. 

Massachusetts .. 

Michigan .. 

) Minnesota. 

Nebraska. 

Nevada . 

) New Hampshire. 

Ohio. 

Oregon. 

Pennsylvania ... 
Rhode Island ... 
41.306 South Carolina.. 

Vermont. 

Wisconsin.. 


Total 


Gains in 
Pop. Votes. 


3.924 

1.824 

1.961 


1.703 

4.772 

1.741 

1.771 

1.733 

1.907 

5.113 

8.364 

1.894 

5.783 

1.992 

13.533 

3.951 

1.682 

3.979 

2.230 

3.931 


74.588 


Tilden’s gains in seventeen States. . 41.306 


Gain for Ilayes in all the States... 33.282 


























































82 


The True Method , 


Which is a deviation equal to one in every 253,746. The True 
Method does not claim to be absolutely correct, vet I think the above 
result shows so close an approximation to exactness as to meet all 
practical requirements, and to commend the True Method to favor¬ 
able consideration and hnai adoption. 

general remarks. 

X had made up a hypothetical set of returns, showing how Tilden, 
with a popular majority of over 400,000, would fail of an election 
under the Buckalew plan, while the True Method would foot up a 
Presidential majority for him of over nineteen votes: but I deem it 
unnecessary to insert it. By supposing a case, I can show that the 
person having the largest popular vote might not be elected under 
the True Method, unless his majority was a decisive one, and he re¬ 
ceived at least a respectable minority in all or nearly all the States. 
Suppose that New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Mis¬ 
souri, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama had given 
Tiiden three-lifths of their populor votes, and each of the others had 
given him two-lifths, he would have had 48,727 majority, but would 
not have been elected by the True Method; and if he received all 
the popular votes in the States named and none in any other State, 
his majority would be 487,273, but he would not be elected: he 
would fall short one full vote. Thus, it will be seen that the True 
Method will prevent a combination among the most populous States 
to overpower those weaker in numbers. This is the great virtue in 
any system which gives the small States a greater relative influence 
than the large States in electing the President. 

The views herein expressed are by no means prompted by sec¬ 
tional feelings: such would lead me to opposite conclusions.* 1 am 
controlled therein by a lofty patriotism which would perpetuate the 
principles upon which the government of Washington and Adams, 

♦Under the True Method the average gain of Presidential over the popular vote 
is forty-nine-hundredths of one per cent to each State in New England; in the 
Pacific States thirty-five-hundredths of one per cent to each State; in the “solid 
South'' thirty-two-hundredths of one per cent. The loss is borne by the populous 
States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Missouri and the States of the Northwest. 
The popular vote theory would allow Ohio to swallow up New England almost en¬ 
tirely, Ohio having nearly as many votes as all the others The Electoral system 
would leave the Republican minority without a voice in the “solid South” in 1880 
and thereafter, but the True Method would give that minority its proper weight in 
making up the final count. 






The True Method. 


S3 


of Hancock and Jefferson, of Jay and Hamilton, is founded. Were 
I looking solely to the advancement of that section in which I was 
born, I would favor the election by popular vote, to be followed soon 
after by a total obliteration of State lines. Did narrow and selfish 
considerations alone prevail, the States of the great valley could in a 
brief space of time overpower all other sections. In 1876 the States of 
Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana cast ‘2,479,939 of the popular 
vote. These States are all washed by the mighty Father of Waters : 
but Ohio, Indiana, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Texas and Alabama 
properly belong to the same group, and these seventeen States 
polled in 1876 no .less than 4,097,448 votes, being 120,189 short of a 
majority. That they will poll more than half the popular vote in 
1880 will not be doubted by any one who rea g 4 carefully the state¬ 
ment which follows. The area of these seventeen States is 1,219,- 
130 square miles* that of the other twenty-one States. 869,837 square 
miles. Giving these seventeen States a density of population equal 
to that of Massachusetts (186.84 to the square mile) and they would 
contain a population of 227,782,249! flow soon this density of pop¬ 
ulation may be obtained I cannot undertake to tell; but some idea 
may be drawn from the fact that in 1860 these States contained 12,- 
373,751, and in 1870 they contained 18,824,134, an increase of 6,450,- 
383, or over fifty per cent. The other States had 18,784,270 in 1860, 
and 19,895,360 in 1870, an increase of 1,108,693, or less than seven 
percent! With alike increase in both sections from 1870 to 1880, 
the seventeen States will contain about 29,230,000, and the twenty- 
one States about 20,290,000, an excess in the seventeen States of the 
Mississippi Valley of nearly 9,000,000! In 1876 these seventeen 
States had— 

Of the popular vote.over 48.51 per cent 

Of Senators in Congress.44.73 per cent 

Of Representatives in Congress.- -.47.78 per cent 

Of Presidential Electors.47.15 per cent 

It is not, then the people of the Mississippi Valley who need tak 
alarm at the possibility of the popular vote theory being adopted, but 
it is the people of the New England States, of New Jersey, Delaware, 
West Virginia, Florida, California, Nevada and Oregon who should 
regard with dismay any attempt to destroy the government of States 
under which we live. The next census will prove the people of the 







SJf Constitutional Amendment. 


Mississippi Valley to be quite able to take care of themselves in any 
political combat in which mere numbers are to be considered. 

Before dismissing this branch of the subject, I will call attention to 
the fact that from 1789 to 1845 all the Presidents except three (Jack- 
son, Harrison and Taylor) and all the Vice Presidents but two (Cal¬ 
houn and R. M. Johnson) came from Virginia, New York and Massa¬ 
chusetts. It may not unfairly be inferred, then, that the hope of 
carrying some particular State, which under the Electoral system 
might turn the scale, has had undue influence in selecting Presiden¬ 
tial candidates. But under the True Method locality would not be 
an important consideration, for by its terms the minority is not swal¬ 
lowed up by the majority. Under the Electoral system no conven¬ 
tion, in view of a close contest, would be likely to weigh impartially 
the claims of Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, or of Mr. Bayard, of Dela¬ 
ware, for a Presidential nomination, each being from a State with but 
few Electoral votes, and neither in any degree doubtful. 


CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT * 

Tn order to carry into effect the True Method, an amendment to 
the Constitution is necessary, and, therefore, I submit the following 
as embodying a remedy for the errors of the Electoral system, pre¬ 
serving to the several States the relative influence in Presidential 
elections that they now possess, and adjusting the Presidential vote 
to the popular vote of each person voted for in the several States 
with almost absolute exactness, besides suggesting a remedy for each 
of certain defects in the Constitution, viz.: 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
Stales of America, in Congress assembled , two-thirds of both Houses 
concurring, That the following be proposed as an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three- 
fourths of the Legislatures of the several States, shall be valid to all 
intents and purposes as part of the said Constitution, to wit: 

ARTICLE XVI. 

Section 1 . Each State shall be entitled to a number of Presiden¬ 
tial votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Represen ta- 

*The memorial of the author of the True Method, praying Congress to submit 
this amendment*to the States, was presented to the Senate by Mr. Garland, and to 
the House by Mr. Cravens,,at the extra session. October, 1877 , 








Constitutional Amendment. 


SB 


tives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress, and the 
qualified electors of each State shall vote by ballot for President and 
Vice President of the United States, one of whom at least shall not 
be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. 

The Presidential votes, or fraction of a Presidential vote, to which 
each person voted for in any State may be entitled, shall be ascer¬ 
tained by multiplying the whole number of the votes of the qualified 
electors in said State for such person by the number of Presidential 
votes to which said State is entitled, and dividing the sum so ob¬ 
tained by the aggregate votes of the qualified electors of said State 
for all persons for President, using for that purpose not exceeding 
three decimal fractions in ascertaining the part of one Presidential 
vote to which such person shall be entitled; provided, that the frac¬ 
tional part of a Presidential vote remaining, after the computation as 
aforesaid shall have been made, shall be added to the Presidential 
vote of the person receiving the highest number of votes of the quali¬ 
fied electors of said State, so as to make up the complete Presidential 
vote of the State, and if two or more persons receive an equal and 
the highest number of votes of the qualified electors of the State, 
then and in that case such fractional remainder shall be divided as 
near as may be between such persons having an equal and the high¬ 
est number of the votes of the qualified electors of the State. 

Sec. 2. The Presidential vote of each State shall be ascertained 
in such manner, pursuant to this article, as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, and lists of such votes for President and Vice President 
shall be signed and certified by the Governor of the State, with the 
seal of the State thereunto attached, one of which lists, sealed and 
indorsed by the Governor “Presidential Votes,” shall immediately 
be transmitted by mail to the seat of government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate; and not less than ten 
days after the Presidential votes of such State shall have been ascer¬ 
tained, and within twenty days thereafter, a list of the Presidential 
votes of such State, sealed and indorsed as aforesaid, shall be trans¬ 
mitted by mail to the seat of government of the United States, 
directed to the President of the Senate. In case no list of Presi¬ 
dential votes shall have been received by the President of the Sen¬ 
ate from any State prior to the first Monday in January next after 
the qualified electors of the several States shall have voted for Presi- 



86 


Constitutional Amendment. 


dent, it shall be the duty of the President of the Senate imme¬ 
diately to notify the Governor of such State that no list of Presiden¬ 
tial votes has been received from said State, and the Governor of 
any State from which no list of Presidential votes shall have been 
received prior to said first Monday in January, shall immediately 
transmit, by special messenger, to be paid out of the treasury of the 
United States, a list of the Presidential votes of such State, signed, 
sealed, certified, indorsed and directed as hereinbefore required, and 
any Presidential votes so received by the President of the Senate 
shall be valid to all intents and purposes. 

On a day to be designated by Congress (or, in case of disagree¬ 
ment between the two Houses of Congress, then upon a day to be 
designated by the President of the United States) which day shall 
not be less than fifteen days nor more than thirty days prior to the 
fourth day of March next after the qualified electors of the several 
States have voted for President of the United States, the two Houses 
of Congress shall meet in joint convention, and on said day the 
President of the Senate, as the presiding officer of said joint conven¬ 
tion, shall, in the presence and under the direction of the two 
Houses of Congress, in joint convention assembled, open all pack¬ 
ages or parcels indorsed “Presidential Votes” by the Governor of 
any State, and not exceeding one of such lists of Presidential votes 
from each State, signed and certified as in this article required, shall 
then and there, under the direction of the two Houses of Congress, 
in joint convention assembled, be counted; and the person having a 
majority of all the Presidential votes to which all the States are en¬ 
titled shall be the President. 

And if no person receive such majority, then from the two persons 
having the highest number of Presidential votes, except as herein¬ 
after provided, the two Houses of Congress, in joint convention as¬ 
sembled, shall immediately, by vim voce vote, choose the President; 
provided, that if two or more persons have the next highest and an 
equal number of Presidential votes, the President shall be chosen in 
the manner herein provided for. 

A quorum for the purpose of electing the President by the two 
Houses of Congress as herein provided for, shall consist of at least 
one Senator and a majority of the Representatives from two-thirds 
of all the States. Each Senator and each Representative shall have 





Constitntio nal Amendmen /. 


37 


one vote, and a majority of the whole number of Senators and Rep¬ 
resentatives in Congress shall be necessary to elect the President. 

And if no election of President shall be made prior to the fourth 
day of March, on said day (except when said day comes on Sunday, 
and then on the fifth day of March) the members of the two Houses 
of Congress shall, by viva voce vote, choose the President in the man¬ 
ner herein provided for, and the voting shall continue from day to 
day until the President is elected; and the person so elected shall 
hold office only until the fourth day of March in the fourth year then 
next ensuing. 

Sec. 3.. The Vice President shall be elected as in this article pro¬ 
vided for the election of the President, in all respects whatever, and 
the votes for Vice President shall be ascertained in the' same manner 
and at the same time as the votes for President, and shall be tranmitted 
to the seat of government in the same packages with the votes for 
President, and shall be opened and counted at the same time and in 
the same manner as the votes for President. 

Sec. 4. When the Vice President is tried on impeachment, the 
Chief Justice or an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court shall pre¬ 
side, but such Chief Justice or Associate Justice shall have no vote 
while presiding over an impeachment trial in any case whatever. 

Sec. 5. In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of Vice Presi¬ 
dent, the two Houses of Congress, within ten days after their next 
regular meeting and organization, shall, in joint convention assem¬ 
bled, choose from one of the several States a Vice President for the 
remainder of the then existing term; provided , that if such vacancy 
occur while Congress is in session, the two Houses of Congress, 
within twenty days after such vacancy occurs, shall choose a Vice 
President in the manner and for the time herein provided for; and 
provided , that no Senater or Representative in Congress at the time 
the vacancy in the office of Vice President occurs shall be chosen to 
fill such vacancy. 

Sec. 6 . The qualifications of electors for President and Vice Presi¬ 
dent in each State shall be the same as the qualifications of electors 
for the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. 

Sec. 7. The votes of the qualified electors for President and Vice 
I J resident shall bo cast on the same day in all the States. 



38 Conclusion. 


CONCLUSION. 

I cannot properly close without alluding in detail to the several 
clauses of the amendment suggested. 

The first clause of section 1 provides for Presidential votes in lieu of 
Electors, each State to have as many as it has Senators and Represent¬ 
atives in Congress—thus continuing the preponderating influence 
of the small States in Presidential elections. Without this, no amend¬ 
ment could even be submitted, for, while the large States might com¬ 
bine in the House and get a two-thirds vote there, the Senators from 
thirteen of the smallest States could prevent the amendment being 
submitted by Congress. Three-fourths of the States being necessary 
to secure ratification, ten of the smallest would be sufficient to reject 
any amendment that might be proposed. 

The second clause points out the mode of ascertaining the Presi¬ 
dential vote, so clear an explanation of which has already been given 
that I deem further comment unnecessary. The superiority of the 
True Method is that all the popular votes in a State (except where 
they are so inconsiderable as those for Smith in Oregon) are felt in 
some degree in electing the President, while under the Buckalew 
plan thousands are of no avail in several of the States, and under 
the Electoral system the voice of the minority in every State is a 
nullity. Under the Electoral system a change of a few hundred 
votes in Oregon, Nevada, Florida or South Carolina would have 
changed the general result of 1876. 

The first clause of section 2 provides that each State , restricted 
only by the Constitution, is to ascertain its own Presidential vote; 
that is, by the two Houses of the Legislature, or a board of can¬ 
vassers, or in any other manner it may choose. 

It is also provided that only such lists of votes as are certified and 
signed by the Governor shall be counted; there can, then, be no 
doubt about what the vote of the State really was. 

The tvro Houses of Congress must meet in joint convention to 
count the votes; the Senate and House would not act as independent 
bodies, and a “dead-lock” would be almost impossible. 

The adoption of the True Method would remove many of the 
temptations to fraud w T hich the Electoral system affords. A few 
fraudulent votes might carry a single State, and change the general 
result under the Electoral system; and it was charged in 1844 that 



Conclusion. 


39 


4,000 or 5,000 votes fraudulently obtained in New York for Mr. Polk 
gave him the vote of that State and secured his election. Whether 
that was so or not, I will not stop to inquire: suffice it to say that 
it was possible under the Electoral system, but not so under the True 
Method. 

A failure of the people to elect the President is also provided for. 
Instead of one House electing the President in such a case, both 
Houses are to elect—one representing the States, the other the people 
of each State. The present mode of electing by the House, each 
State having one vote, is very objectionable. Thus: in five States 
one is a majority, in seven States two is a majority, in five other States 
three, and in three States four is a majority of the delegation in the 
House. Here are twenty States, and forty-six members from those 
States might elect the President, though there are 293 members in 
all. If Congress be called upon to elect the President under the 
proposed amendment, a choice must be made between the two high¬ 
est on the list of those voted for, except in the possible event of two 
persons having a tie vote and each standing next to the highest on 
the list, and Senators and Representatives to have one vote each. If 
no choice is made by the fourth of March, members of a new Con¬ 
gress then come in, and the duty of electing the President devolves 
on them at once. 

Section 3 brings the election of Vice President under the rule for 
the election of President. It provides for a presiding officer when 
the Vice President is tried on impeachment. As the law now is the 
Vice President would have a right to preside while he was on trial 
before the Senate on articles of impeachment. It also forbids the 
Chief or Associate Justice from voting while presiding in any im¬ 
peachment trial. During the trial of President Johnson on impeach¬ 
ment Chief Justice Chase voted two or three times—the exercise of a 
doubtful power in the opinion of one so eminent for learning as Mr. 
Sumner, who entered a vigorous protest against it. 

Section 3 also provides for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presi¬ 
dency. For about twenty years since the Constitution went into 
effect next to the highest office for which it provides has been va¬ 
cant, although this is not generally known, many people believing 
that the President of the Senate pro tern, is the Vice President in cer¬ 
tain cases. The President of the Senate, is a Senator, with the addi- 



40 


Conclusion. 


tional powers of a presiding officer wlien the Vice President is ab¬ 
sent or his office is vacant. He votes on all questions, introduces bills 
and resolutions, or participates in debate, neither of which the Vice 
President can do; and the Vice President has the casting vote in case 
of a tie, which the President pro tern . has not in any case. Vice 
President Johnson became President on the death of Mr. Lincoln, 
and Mr. Foster was chosen President of the Senate pro term. Had 
Mr. Johnson died a week after he became President, Mr. Foster 
would have acted as President until an election was held, as is pro¬ 
vided for by the act of 1792. Had Mr. Foster been Vice President, 
on the death or resignation of Mr. Johnson he would have become 
President as fully as if he had been elected to that office. 

Section 4 fixes the qualifications of voters for President, which 
must be the same as those of the most numerous branch of the State 
Legislature. 

Believing that the True Method, if adopted, will prevent the recur¬ 
rence of any such threatening complications as those growing out of 
the election of 1876—which weighed like a hideous nightmare upon 
the business interest of the people, stiffing every energy, involving 
thousands in financial ruin, and menacing the country with the hor¬ 
rors of civil war--I submit it to the candid consideration of men of all 
parties. Under the plan herein proposed no danger to the peace of 
the country can arise over a Presidential election. The rights of the 
States will be respected, and a fair expression of the popular voice 
can and will always be obtained by and through the adoption of 


THE TRUE METHOD. 




APPENDIX. 


HOW TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. 


Article Y declares that “the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both 
Houses, shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this 
Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds 
of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amend¬ 
ments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and pur¬ 
poses as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures 
of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions of three- 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be 
proposed by the Congress.” 

It will be seen that it requires two-thirds of both Houses of Con¬ 
gress (each acting independently of the other) to propose an amend¬ 
ment. There being seventy-six Senators, fifty-one votes are neces¬ 
sary to propose an amendment. Taking the census of 1870 as a 
basis, I find that the States below named had each a population as 
follows: 


Arkansas.481,471 

California.560,247 

Connecticut ...537,454 

Florida.187,748 

Kansas.364,399 

Total. 


Minnesota ... .439,706 

Nebraska.122,963 

Nevada. 42,491 

N. Hampshire.318,300 


Oregon. 90,932 

Rhode Island-.217,353 

Vermont.330,551 

West Virginia..442,014 


4,195,619 


And the Senators from these States, with less than eleven per cent 
of the population, could prevent any amendment being proposed. 

In the House of Representatives there are 293 members, and 196 
would be a two-thirds vote. 

After a resolution proposing an amendment has passed both 
6 

















The True Method vs. The Electoral System. 




Houses, even by a two-thirds vote in each, it must be presented to 
the President. Article 1, section 7, declares that every bill, before 
it become a law, shall be presented to the President, etc., and that 
every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Sen¬ 
ate and House may be necessary (except on a question of adjourn¬ 
ment) shall be presented to the President, according to the rules 
and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. 

After a resolution proposing an amendment has passed, even over 
the President’s veto, the trouble has but fairly begun. 

In order to become a part of the Constitution, an amendment 
must be ratified by three-fourths of the States, and hence, with 
thirty-eight States in the Union, twenty-nine State Legislatures, each 
with two separate Houses, must ratify, or the amendment fails for 
the time being. If twenty-eight States should ratify, and one House 
in the twenty-ninth State should withhold its approval, it would be 
equivalent to a rejection. The States of Arkansas, Florida, Minne¬ 
sota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island 
Vermont and West Virginia, with but little over seven per cent of 
the population in 1870, could, either by adverse action or no action 
at all, defeat any amendment submitted. As only fourteen or fifteen 
Legislatures are now in session and only two or three others to meet 
before November, there is little probability of any amendment being 
ratified until after the next Presidential election. 


THE TRUE METHOD VS. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM. 

[Prom the Pine Bluff (Ark.) Republican, Nov, 7 , 1878 .] 

That the Electoral system has not led to anarchy and revolution is 
attributable to good fortune rather than to the temper of the Ameri¬ 
can people. Ever since the election of Mr. Adams by the House in 
1825, efforts have been made to devise some other method of elect¬ 
ing the Chief Magistrate, but none so far has received the sanction 
of Congress. The True Method, as we believe, was presented to 
Congress by Senator Garland and to the House by Mr. Cravens at 
the extra session in 1877, and a majority of the House committee 
has submitted a proposed amendment embodying the most important 




The True Method vs. The Electoral System. 


features of the original amendment prepared by the author of the 
True Method, but the committee’s report departs from the original 
proposition, in that it proposes to confer upon Congress certain 
powers in regard to disputed votes with which no department of the 
Federal Government should ever be entrusted. 


But we have digressed somewhat. Our object is to show a few of 
the crudities of the Electoral system, and how narrowly within the 
past half a century the country has escaped revolution under its 
workings. In the following tabular statement will be found the num¬ 
ber of States choosing Electors by popular vote, number of such 
States received by each President, his per cents of the popular vote, 
of the Electoral vote, and of the Presidential vote under the True 
Method: 


Year. President. 

States 

Voting. 

States 

Reo’d, 

Pop. 

Vote. 

Elect’l 

Vote. 

Pres’l 

Vote. 

1836—Van Buren... 

25 

15 

50.8 

60.0 

*52.1 

1840—Harrison... 

25 

19 

52.8 

82.6 

53.4 

1844—Polk. 

25 

14 

49.5 

60.5 

f49.4 

47.9 

1848—Taylor. 

29 

15 

47.3 

58.0 

1852—Pierce. 

30 

26 

50.9 

88.0 

50.7 

1856—Buchanan. 

30 

18 

45.3 

61.1 

46.8 

1860—Lincoln. 

32 

17 

39.9 

61.1 

31.7 

1864—Lincoln . 

26 

23 

55.0 

90.0 

56.0 

1868—Grant. 

33 

25 

62.6 

72.7 

52.2 

1872—Grant. 

37 

31 

55.6 

78.2 

53.4 

1876—Hayes. 

37 

19 

47.9 

49.7 

47.8 



In 1836 it required an average of 4,479 popular votes to choose a 
Van Buren Elector; 6,518 for an opposition Elector. In the States 
Van Buren carried he received 476,403 popular votes, not one-third, 
yet these votes elected him. If he had received no popular votes in 
Alabama or North Carolina, his quota would have been reduced to 
430,525, less than 29 per cent, and still he would have been elected. 

In 1840 for a Harrison Elector, 5,460; for a Van Buren Elector, 
23,035. Yan Buren suffered an overwhelming Electoral defeat, yet in 
Maine, Maryland, New York and Pennsylvania, with ninety-two 
Electors, Harrison’s pluralities were only 16,023; and had Yan 

♦Van Buren required one-eighth the popular vote of South Carolina to elect him 
under the True Method. tPolk required nearly two-thirds. 
























The True Method vs. The Electoral System. 


Buren taken from Harrison 202 votes in Maine, 2,389 in Maryland 
5,300 in New York, and 175 in Pennsylvania, he would have been re¬ 
elected, though Harrison would have led him 130,000 popular votes. 

In 1844 a change of 2,556 from Polk to Clay would have elected 
the latter. 

It required 8,332 popular votes in 1848 for a Taylor Elector; for a 
Cass Elector, 10,344. 

In 1852 Pierce received 254 of the 296 Electors. Yet changes of 
17,100 popular votes in six States, with 107 Electors, would have 
elected Scott. Popular votes to a Pierce Elector, 6,286; to a Scott 
Elector, 33,013. 

In 1856 for a Buchanan Elector, 11,074; for a Fremont Elector, 
11,766; for a Fillmore Elector, 109,317. 

In 1860 the per cents of popular and Electoral votes and the ratios 
of popular votes to one Elector were as follows: 


Lincoln.. 

Elec. Vote, 
61.0 

Pop. Vote. 

39.9 

natio. 

10,480 

Breckinredge. 

21.7 

18.1 

13,243 

Bell. 

13.2 

12.6 

15,078 

114,598 

Douglas. 

4.0 

29.4 


In 1864 an average change of thirty-five votes in every one thou¬ 
sand in nine States would have elected McClellan, while Lincoln’s 
popular majority would still have been 507,000. Chance only saved 
the country from anarchy. 

In 1868, for a Grant Elector, 14,290; for a Seymour Elector, 33,- 
871 popular votes. 

In 1872, for a Grant Elector, 12,577; for a Greeley Elector, 42,- 
941 popular votes. 

The contest oi 1876 was the most remarkable of all. Charges of 
fraud were freely made, and it seemed for weeks that no result could be 
reached. If no fraud was committed, Hayes owes his election to the 
vote of Florida, where he received nearly 510 in every 1,000 popular 
votes; hence, a change of five votes in ever}'' thousand from Hayes 
to Tilden would have given Florida to Tilden, and secured his elec¬ 
tion. A thousand popular votes in Florida would have been of more 
avail to Tilden than the million and three hundred thousand he re¬ 
ceived in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and 












Communication in New Orleans Democrat. 


Wisconsin. South Carolina is a more striking illustration, for changes 
of twenty-seven in every ten thousand would have elected Tilden. 

Can any one imagine greater temptation to fraud than the Electoral 
system offered in the Florida or South Carolina case ? Not to have 
yielded to it required the highest order of integrity, the loftiest pa¬ 
triotism, the greatest self-denial and the most heroic courage. We 
are not surprised if frauds were committed; the Electoral system 
admits of the most stupendous frauds. Therefore we insist that the 
system ought to be abolished and the True Method adopted. 


THE TRUE METHOD OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES—OBJECTIONS TO THE 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM CONSIDERED. 

New Orleans, January 22, 1880. 

To the Editor of the Democrat: 

I see by late news from Washington that the House Committee on 
the state of the law respecting the ascertainment and declaration of 
the result of election of President and Vice President are about re¬ 
porting a joint resolution in favor of so amending the Constitution as 
to abolish the Electoral Colleges and to substitute therefor a direct 
vote of the people, and providing that each State shall continue to 
have, as now, a number of votes for President equal to its whole 
number of Senators and Representatives in Congress, and providing 
further that the vote of each person voted for in any State shall be 
ascertained by multiplying his popular vote in the State by the State’s 
Electoral vote and dividing the result by the total popular vote of 
the State, for which purpose three decimal fractions may be used in 
ascertaining the fraction of a Presidential vote to which any person 
voted for in any State may be entitled. 

So far as the manner of voting for President by the people of the 
States directly is concerned, and also in the manner of ascertaining 
the vote in each State of any person voted for, the plan of the House 
Committee is for all practical purposes the same as that embodied 
in my petition to Congress in October, 1877, which was presented to 
the Senate by Air. Garland, of Arkansas, and to the House by Air. 
Cravens, of the same State. (See Congressional Record, extra ses¬ 
sion, 1877.) Before attempting to point out the superiority of the 




Communication in New Orleans Democrat. 


& 


True Method over the Electoral system, I will submit a tabular state¬ 
ment showing the difference in the results under each, respectively, 
at previous elections: 



Pop. Vote, 

Electoral 

System. 

True 

Method. 

Elec. Vote. 

Elec. Vote. 

1824 — Pennsylvania — Jackson. 

36,100 

28 

21.35 

Adams. 

. 5,440 


3.21 

Crawford. 

4,206 


2.49 

Clay. 

1,609 

-- 

0.95 

Total. 

47,355 

28 

28.00 

1844—Massachusetts—Polk. 

52,486 


4.83 

Clay ... 

67,478 

12 

6.18 

Birney. 

10,800 

*- 

0.99 

Total . . 

131,064 

12 

12.00 

1860 — Pennsylvania — Lincoln . 

268,030 

27 

15.20 

Douglas . 

16,765 

. . 

0.95 

Breckinredge .... 

178,871 


10.13 

Bell . 

12,776 

-- 

0.72 

Total . 

476,442 

27 

27.00 


Referring to the election of 1876, I submit the following by way 
of comparing the Electoral system with the True Method: 



Popular 

Vote, 

Electoral 

System. 
Elec. Vote 

True Method 
Elector’l Vote 

Alabama—Tilden. 

102,002 

10 

5.992 

Hayes. 

68,230 

_ „ 

4.008 

Delaware—Tilden.. 

13,381 

3 

1.664 

Hayes. 

10,752 

.. 

1.336 

Texas—Tilden. 

104,755 

8 

5.604 

Hayes. 

44,800 

. . 

2.396 

Iowa—Tilden. 

112,099 


4.203 

Hayes. 

171,327 

11 

6.426 

Cooper . 

9,901 


0.371 

Wisconsin—Tilden. 

128,927 

_ _ 

4.838 

Hayes. 

130,668 

10 

5.104 

Cooper . 

1,509 


0.058 


Taking the foregoing five States by way of illustration, I find that 


Tilden received 456,164 popular votes, Hayes 419,777, and Cooper 
11,410—the Electoral system* giving Tilden 21, Hayes 21, and Cooper 













































Communication in New Orleans Democrat. 




nothing; but the True Method would give Tilden 22.301, Hayes 
10.270, and Cooper .429. 

Before proceeding to any further consideration of the merits of the 
True Method, I beg leave to direct attention to a few of the most 
striking objections to the system under which Presidents have been 
elected since 1804. For this purpose allow me to refer to the mode 
pointed out by the Constitution for the election of President. Ar¬ 
ticle II, section 1, declares that “each State shall appoint, in such 
manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors 
equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress,” etc. That the provision 
for the appointment of Electors was founded in distrust of the peo¬ 
ple is firmly maintained by some writers, and vehemently denied by 
others. But be that as it may, a distrust of the people was not the 
only reason for the adoption of a system giving certain States a 
greater relative influence in the election of President than other 
States. Had a distrust of the people been the moving cause, Elec¬ 
tors would have been made to correspond with the number of Rep¬ 
resentatives in Congress to which each State might be entitled. Had 
such a system been adopted, the difference in the voting power of 
the several States at the first election for President would have been 
as follows: 


States. 

Representatives. 

Per Cent. 

Electors, 

Per Cent 

New Hampshire. 

3 

4.60 

5 

5.5 

Massachusetts _____ 

8 

12.30 

10 

11.0 

Rhode Isiand... 

1 

1.54 

3 

3.3 

Connecticut. 

5 

7.70 

7 

7.7 

New York. 

6 

9.24 

8 

8.8 

New Jersey . 

4 

6.16 

6 

6.6 

Pennsylvania. 

8 

12.32 

10 

11.0 

Delaware... 

1 

4.60 

3 

3.3 

Maryland. 

6 

9.24 

8 

8.8 

Virginia.*_ 

10 

15.40 

12 

13.0 

North Carolina... 

5 

7.77 

7 

7.7 

South Carolina. 

5 

7.77 

7 

7.7 

Georgia. 

3 

4.60 

5 

5.5 


From the foregoing it will be seen that Connecticut, North Caro¬ 
lina and South Carolina exercised the same voting power under the 
system adopted as under'the system basing Electors upon the num¬ 
ber of Representatives only; but under the supposed plan the States 



























Communication in New Orleans Democrat , 


4* 


of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware and Georgia 
would have had their voting power reduced from 24.17 per cent to 
18.46—a difference against them of 23.62 per cent, and Massachusetts, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia would have had their 
voting power increased from 52.74 per cent to 58.46—a difference in 
their favor of 10.84. It will scarcely be questioned, then, that at 
least one object sought in the adoption of the Electoral system was 
to give the small States greater relative power in electing President, 
than the more populous States, to the end that thostJ weaker in num¬ 
bers might not be overpowered by combinations among the large 
States. This is the only merit the Electoral system ever had, and the 
True Method proposes to retain that feature. 

It is claimed by the friends of the Electoral system, but I think 
without any very forcible reason, that it was the design of the framers 
of the Constitution that, in order to maintain the entity of the States 
its votes should all be cast for the same persons for President and 
Vice President. If such was their intention, many of the framers of our 
organic law lived to see that design frustrated, for at the first elec¬ 
tion only three of the ten States voting gave a solid vote for Presi¬ 
dent and Vice President; at the third election eleven of the sixteen 
States voted solidly for President; the plan of nominations by Con¬ 
gressional caucusses tended still further to solidify the votes of the 
States, and at each election since parties have designated nominees by 
national conventions Presidential Electors have only performed min¬ 
isterial duties, and the votes of States have generally been cast solidly 
for the nominees of the dominant party at the State election for Presi¬ 
dential Electors. Another reason for my belief that it was not the 
original design that the States were to give a solid vote for President, 
is that Senators are required to be so classified that those from 
any given State shall belong to different classes, and it will not be 
claimed, I opine, that because the States are not allowed to elect their 
Senators in solido that their sovereignty is in any degree infringed 
upon. Owing to the classification of Senators, as prescribed by ar¬ 
ticle I, section 3, the States of Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Mississippi, Louisiana and California have each one Democratic and 
one Republican Senator. As a further reason for my opinion that the 
solidity of the State was not contemplated is that section 4 of article 
I confers upon Congress certain powers in connection with the elec- 



Communication in New Orleans Democrat. 




tion of Senators and Representatives, and pursuant thereto States 
having more than one Representatives are required by law to be 
divided into suitable districts for the choice of Representatives in 
Congress; and pursuant to an act of Congress one House of a State 
Legislature cannot prevent the election of a Senator in Congress by 
refusing to go into joint convention, as was frequently the case before 
the act alluded to was passed. But for the district system the present 
House of Representatives would contain over 160 Republicans of the 
293 members. 

I have enlarged somewhat upon my views concerning the original 
design of our forefathers in the adoption of the Electoral system, and 
I shall next endeavor to show that a departure from that design has 
rendered that system not only useless, but an instrument which may 
be used at any time to thwart the will of the people by corrupt parti¬ 
san agencies. It is alleged by a committee of the House, appointed 
to investigate the subject, that such frauds were committed in 
Florida and Louisiana as to give the Electoral votes of those States 
to Mr. Hayes, when in fact Mr. Tilden received a majority of the 
popular vote in each. 

It will be remembered that the award of the Electoral Commission 
was 185 for Kayes and 184 for Tilden. Therefore, leaving Louisiana 
out of the count, the vote of Florida turned the scale, for had that 
State’s four votes been awarded to Tilden, he would have had 188 
votes to 181 for Hayes. There was, therefore, the greatest possible 
temptation to fraud; the Presidency was at stake, with the immense 
patronage it commands, amounting probably to a hundred million 
dollars in a single term of four years; and it was only necessary to 
operate either upon the ignorance or the cupidity of a few men to 
stifle the voice of the American people, and render nugatory the sol¬ 
emn acts of sovereign States. Inveigh as we may against the per¬ 
petrators of frauds, a system that offers opportunity for their perpe¬ 
tration with impunity is certainly at fault, and ought to be changed. 

V Another objection to the Electoral system is that a Presidential 
contest, where parties are as nearly divided equally as they are now, 
is practically confined to a few pivotal States. The contest next fall 
will most certainly depend upon the votes of Indiana and New York 
The party which can carry both those States is certain of gaining the 
Presidential prize, Party platforms will be constructed to meet the 
7 



50 


Communication in New Orleans Democrat. 


views of those two States; candidates most likely to win popular 
favor in those States will he advanced to the front, without proper 
regard to general fitness, and all the corrupting influences which par¬ 
tisan rancor and a love of spoils can evoke will be centered in New 
York and Indiana, and in effect those two States will elect the next 
President, as they hold the balance of power. 

Again : Under the provision of the Constitution empowing the 
Legisature of each State to point out the manner of choosing Presi¬ 
dential Electors, it is gravely proposed in New York State that 
the Legislature pass an act providing for the election of two 
Presidential Electors for the State at large and one for each of the 
thirty-three districts. There being at present nine Democratic and 
twenty-four Republican districts, the Republicans rely upon carry¬ 
ing at least twenty of the districts, even though the Democrats may 
succeed in carrying the State. But the Republican Legislature of 
New York may even go so far as to provide by law for the appoint¬ 
ment of the Electors by the Legislature, in which case it would only 
be necessary for the sitting members of that body to convene on the 
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November next and choose 
thirty-five Republican Electors, and no legal objection could be urged, 
even though the State might be Democratic, for the system against 
which I have warred in my feeble way for the past two or three years 
admits of such proceedings. Ohio may follow in the wake of New 
York; first, however, redistricting the State, and so gerrymandering 
the districts as to give the Republicans ten or eleven, instead of the 
nine districts they now hold; and it is in the power of the Ohio Leg¬ 
islature to take upon itself the choice of the Electors, and if both 
New York and Ohio should determine to allow their Legislatures to 
choose the Electors, all eyes would be directed with increased interest 
to the next national Republican convention, for the nominees of that 
body would be certain of election. 

Still another objection to the Electoral system is found in the mode 
of choosing the President by the House in case the Colleges fail to 
elect. As the House now stands no President would likely be chosen 
by that body, for each State in such case has one vote. The Demo¬ 
crats have tbs sixteen Southern States, together with Ohio and 
Oregon, eighteen in all—twenty being required. The Republicans 
have nineteen States; Indiana has six Democrats, six Republicans 




Communication in New Orleans Democrat. 


Si 


and one Greenbacker. Should the election devolve upon the House, 
the Indiana Greenbacker would have it in his power to join the.Re¬ 
publicans and give them a majority of the delegation, and Indiana, 
added to the States the Republicans now have, would elect their nomi¬ 
nee. On the other hand, if he voted otherwise than for the Republican 
no election could be had as parties in the House now stand. The Sen¬ 
ate, however, being Democratic, would choose the nominee of that 
party for Vice President, and the duties of the Presidential office 
would devolve upon him. A case occurred in 1825 in which the soli¬ 
tary Representative from Missouri decided the great issue of the 
Presidency between John Quincy Adams and John C. Calhoun. As 
is well known, the election of 1824 for President devolved upon the 
House, Andrew Jackson, J. Q. Adams and Wm. H. Crawford being 
the only persons eligible. There were twenty- four States then in the 
Union—thirteen being a majority; and the vote of the Missouri 
Representative turned the scale in favor of Mr. Adams, who had 
twelve votes without Missouri. Had the gentleman from Missouri 
persisted in voting against Mr. Adams no election by the House 
would have been had, and Mr. Calhoun, who had been elected Vice 
President by the Electoral Colleges, would, have been ex-officio Presi¬ 
dent. But in view of the election of President by the House, the 
action of that body upon two contested cases now pending possesses 
unusual interest at present. The seat of a Republican from Indiana 
is contested by a Democrat, and a Republican holds a seat as Rep¬ 
resentative from Minnesota which is claimed by a Democrat. Should 
these contests be decided in favor of the Democratic contestants, it 
would add two States to the Democrats and enable them to elect their 
nominee should the election devolve upon the House. 

None of the complications and dangers which the Electoral system 
admits of apply at all to the True Method, and I am convinced, after 
devoting much time and labor to the investigation of the subject, 
that any such difficulty as threatened the peace of the country in 1877 
is impossible under the amendment to the Constitution which the 
House Committee has had in charge since the session of December, 
1877. The True Method provides for an election by a direct vote of 
the people, and gives due weight to every vote cast, while under the 
Electoral system in more than half the States voting for Presidential 
Electors is only a matter of form. Under the True Method the States 




52 A Popular Vote for President. 

retain the right they now possess of declaring the qualifications of 
voters; the result in each State is to be finally decided by its own tribu¬ 
nals, and only votes certified to by the Governor, with the State seal 
attached, are to be counted; the tw r o Houses of Congress (instead of act¬ 
ing independently of each other and passing upon the validity of the 
votes of a State) are to meet in joint convention to witness the count. 
It admits of no dead-lock such as that which presented so threaten¬ 
ing an aspect in 1877. It recognizes every right to which any State 
may justly lay claim, and maintains the greater relative power of the 
small States in electing the President, in order that combinations of 
the most populous States may not exert an undue and pernicious in¬ 
fluence in choosing the President. Under the Electoral system a 
fraud perpetrated in a single State may change its vote, and by such 
fraudulent action the entire result may be changed. As is generally 
believed, the wrongful throwing out of votes in Florida made Hayes 
President; but with the identical popular votes upon which the Elec¬ 
toral Commission acted, Tilden would have been elected, and any at¬ 
tempt to carry the last Presidential election by fraud would have in¬ 
volved (under the True Method) the wrongful change of over one 
hundred thousand votes from the Democratic to the Republican col¬ 
umn, and, instead of being confined to a few localities, corrupting 
agencies would have been necessary in nearly every State. 

The subject under consideration is one of the greatest possible in¬ 
terest to the whole American people, and should engage the earnest 
attention of the press, of statesmen, and of the people generally. 

Augustus D. Jones. 


A POPULAR VOTE FOR PRESIDENT. 

[From the New Orleans Democrat, Jan. 27 ,1880 ] 

Mr. Townsend (Democrat) of Illinois has introduced in the House 
a joint resolution to amend the Constitution so that the President 
and Vice President of the United States shall be elected by a ma¬ 
jority of the people. Many as are the objections to the Electoral 
system, the popular vote theory is such a dangerous step in the direc¬ 
tion of centralization that Democrats adhering to the opinions of Jef¬ 
ferson, of Jackson, of Renton, and of Calhoun, can only contemplate 
Mr. Townsend’s proposition with surprise and sentiments as nearly 
allied to disrespect as the gravity of the subject and a decent regard 






A Popular Vote for President. 


S3 


for the opinions of the gentleman from Illinois will permit. It is 
not within the line of legitimate argumentation to question any gen¬ 
tleman’s sincerity, nor is it decorous to meet even a fallacious position 
by an attempt at ridicule. Hence, Mr. Townsend’s proposition must 
stand or fall on its own merits. 

In order to reach any fair analysis of the gentleman’s proposition 
it is first necessary to glance at the nature of the Federal Govern¬ 
ment and the relations which the States bear to it. 

That no consolidated government was intended by the framers of 
the Constitution is conclusively shown in every line and word of the 
fundamental law upon which the Union is based, unless it be the pre¬ 
amble, upon the words of which, and upon these only, the friends of 
consolidation base their fallacious and dangerous political heresy. 
The preamble recites that — 

“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more per¬ 
fect Union, * * * do ordain and establish this Constitution,” etc. 

It should be noticed in this connection that the present Constitu¬ 
tion superseded the Articles of Confederation, wherein it was declared 
that “in determining questions in the United States, in Congress as¬ 
sembled, each State shall have one vote.” 

This was regarded as not so perfect a Union as was deemed ad¬ 
visable, and hence the present Constitution provided for & more perfect 
Union; that is, a Union more perfect than that which held the States 
together during the war of the revolution and until it was succeeded 
by the more perfect Union provided for by the Constitution. Had a 
perfect Union been provided for, the preamble would have said so, 
and it could not have been left optional with the States of the Con¬ 
federation to join the more perfect Union. But that the States had 
the right to adhere to the Articles of Confederation or join the more 
perfect Union, is clearly proved by article VII of the Constitution, 
which delares that the ratifications of the conventions (not the peo¬ 
ple) of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this 
Constitution between the States so redifying the same. 

Had a consolidation of all the States been contemplated, “we, the 
people,” would have declared that a ratification of the Constitution 
by a majority of the people of the United States should give that in¬ 
strument full force and validity. But “we, the people,” did not make 
the present Constitution, for in the convention which framed it each 




The Popular Vote for President. 


u 


State had one vote; in its ratifiaction each State had one vote, and in 
the ratification of the several amendments thereto each State had one 
vote. “Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the States 
present” is the superscription to the charter of our liberties which 
immediately precedes the signature of Geo. Washington as President 
and Deputy from Virginia. It is a historical fact that on the seven¬ 
teenth of September, 1787, the Constitution was adopted, and on the 
seventh of December following little Delaware, in the exercise of a 
sovereignty won by the valor of Washington and Lafayette, of War¬ 
ren and Marion, wa3 the first to give in her adherence to the new 
Constitution. Other States followed until the twenty-first of June, 
1788, when the ratification by New Hampshire (the ninth State) gave 
effect to the Constitution “between the States so ratifying the same;” 
but it had no more validity in the States of Virginia, New York, 
North Carolina and Rhode Island than if it had never been adopted. 

So there can be no question but that this government of the United 
States is nothing more than a government of States; the several 
States comprising the Union retaining all the rights they had under 
the Confederation except such as have been delegated to the Federal 
Government. (See Tenth Amendment; “The powers not delegated 
to the United States by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”) 

Among the rights not merely reserved, but expressly guaranteed, 
is (see article V) that “no State shall, without its consent, be deprived 
of its equal suffrage in the Senate.” This provision is an important 
factor in the matter of electing the President, for article II declares 
that each State shall appoint a number of Electors equal to its whole 
number of Senators and Representatives in Congress. It cannot 
escape the notice of the most casual observer that the framers of the 
Constitution intended to give the smaller States greater relative 
power in the choice of President than States of greater numerica 
strength. But Mr. Townsend’s proposition contemplates a total dis¬ 
regard of State lines, and by grouping the people of all the States 
into one community, each State would lose its entity, and those weak 
in numbers would be reduced to the condition of obscure counties 
or parishes in a State. That the adoption of Mr. Townsend’s propo¬ 
sition would operate with crushing effect upon at least thirteen of the 
States is clearly susceptible of demonstration, basing calculations 



The Popular Vote for President 


55 


upon the popular and Electoral votes of 1876, as the following tabu¬ 
lar statement will show: 


States. 

Electors. 

Popular Votes.| states. Electors. 

Popular Votes 

Arkansas 

.6 

97,029.Nevada. 3 

19,691 

Colarado.. 

.3 

27,474jN. Hampshire-. 5 

80,124 

Delaware . 

.3 

24,133iOregon. 3 

29,865 

Florida_ 

. .... 4 

47,792 Rhode Island.. 4 

26,567 

Kansas_ 

. 5 

124,000 Vermont.. 5 

64,346 

Maine .... 

.7 

116,786|West Virginia.. 5 

100,526 

Nebraska. 
Total .. 

.3 

51,7901 — 

..56 

810,123 

Per cent _. 



9.60 


Showing a loss in the voting power of these thirteen States, should 
Mr. Townsend’s scheme be adopted, of over 36 per cent. 


These thirteen States are cited by way of illustration, because they 
have twenty-six of the seventy-six Senators, and could prevent the 
proposed amendment from receiving the requisite two-thirds vote in 
the Senate. But, improbable as it appears, should Mr. Townsend’s 
amendment pass both Houses of Congress, a still greater difficulty 
would present itself, for it requires the ratifications of three-fourths 
of all the States to give validity to this amendment, and adverse ac¬ 
tion, or even non-action, by any ten of these would put an effectual 
quietus upon the proposition. Pending action upon his proposed 
measure, should Mr. Townsend ever appear before the people of 
either of the following States, he might be called upon to rise and 
explain: 


States. 

Electors. 

Popular Votes. 

States. Electors. 

Popular Votes 

Arkansas . 

.6 

97,029 

Nevada.. 

. 3 

19,691 

Colorado . 

.3 

27,474 

N. Hampshire . 

. 5 

80,124 

Delaware . 

.3 

24,133 

Oregon . 

3 

29,865 

Florida ... 

.4 

47,792 

Rhode Island. . 

. 4 

26,567 

Nebraska . 

.3 

51,790 

Vermont.. 

. 5 

64,346 


Total..39 468,811 

Per cent.10.57 5.56 


Total..39 468,811 

Per cent.10.57 5.56 


Showing a loss in the voting power of these ten States of 47.4 per 
cent. In view of these incontestible facts, there is not a ghost of a 
chance for the Townsend proposition. 





































56 


The Presidential Count. 


THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNT. 

[From the New Orleans Democrat, February 4,1880.] 

As is well known to the general public, the Electoral system of 
choosing Presidents allows each State a number of Electors equal to 
its whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress; the 
Electors are to be chosen in each State in such manner as its Legis¬ 
lature may direct, and by a general understanding the Electors per¬ 
form only ministerial duties. Hence, the political party which may 
be able to choose the Electors, even by a plurality of the popular 
vote, counts the entire Electoral vote of the State. Under the Elec¬ 
toral system Presidents have been chosen since the first election of 
Washington in 1789; but to guard against another such crisis as was 
presented by the tie vote between Jefferson and Burr, in 1801, the 
system was amended so as to require Electors to vote in separate 
ballots for President and Vice President. It seems clear to our 
mind that the original design of the framers of the Constitution was 
that Electors should exercise some discretion or judgment in the 
choice of the President; but that design was departed from to a 
greater or less extent until 1836, since which time, except on one or 
two occasions, and then only in a few instances, the dominant party 
in each State has counted the entire vote. The practice of voting in 
solido has led to many incongruous results, and in 1876-77 brought 
the country to the verge of anarchy. That some amendment to the 
Constitution was necessary to obviate any such complications in the 
future seemed apparent to every thoughtful mind, and accordingly, 
early in 1877, Augustus D. Jones, a journeyman printer, then a citi¬ 
zen of Arkansas, but now residing in this city, prepared, under the 
title of “True Method of Electing the President,” etc., a volume re¬ 
viewing the Electoral system, the Buckalew plan and the popular 
vote theory, and at the same time submitting a plan which he called 
“The True Method,” and explaining its purposes. The True Method 
follows the Electoral system only so far as to allow each State a num¬ 
ber of votes for President equal to all its Senators and Representa¬ 
tives in Congress; but instead of allowing the dominant party in a 
State to control all its votes for President, every person voted for is * 
to have the same proportion of the Presidential votes as he receives 
of the popular vote, three decimals to be used in ascertaing the frac¬ 
tion of a vote received. To illustrate. Jet us apply the Electoral sys- 



The Presidential Count. 


67 


tem and the True Method, respectively, to the vote of Louisiana for 
Governor last fall, assuming that Mr. Wiltz and Mr. Beattie had been 
opposing candidates for the Presidency. The vote for Wiltz was 72,- 
610; for Beattie, 41,460; total, 114,070. 

Louisiana has eight votes for President, and under the Electoral 
system Mr. Wiltz, who received the highest number of votes, would 
have received the whole number. But not so under the method pre¬ 
pared by Mr. Jones, and embodied in a memorial of that gentleman 
which was submitted to the Senate by Mr. Garland and to the House* 
by Mr. Cravens at the extra session of Congress in October, 1877, 
and which is now under consideration in the House. The True 
Method provides that each State shall have a number of Presidential 
votes equal to its Senators and .Representatives in Congress; that the 
people shall vote directly for President, and that the proportion of 
each person's Presidential vote shall be ascertained by multiplying 
his popular vote by the State’s Electoral vote and dividing the pro¬ 
duct by the total popular vote*of the State. Applying the True 
Method to the vote for Governor of Louisiana last fall, we should 
multiply the vote for wiltz (72,616) by the State Electoral vote (8),. 
which would give 580,880; divide this by the whole vote of the State 
(114,070) and the result would show 5.092 votes for Wiltz. In the 
same manner the portion to which Mr. Beattie was entitled would be- 
ascertained. To give a practical illustration of the workings of both 
the Electoral system and the True Method, we have prepared a tabu¬ 
lar statement showing what the result would have been under each 
system in each State, basing our calculations upon the last State elec¬ 
tions, and assuming that the votes given had been cast for Presiden¬ 
tial Electors; 




58 The Presidential Count. 


States. 

E!e< 

D. 

store. 

R. 

True 

D. 

Method. 

R. 

Alabama, Governor, 1876. 

~10 

i . . . . 

6.41C 

) 31)90 

Arkansas. Congress, 1878 . 

6 


2.404 

1.163 

California Governor, 1879 . 


6 

; 1.681 

2.546 

Colorado, Supreme Judge, 1779. 


3 

1.234 

X.644 

Connecticut, Governor, 1878 . 


6 

2.657 

2.932 

Delaware, Governor, 1878 ... 

3 


2.382 

Florida, Congress, 1878... 

4 

• .. ♦ 

2.166 

1.834 

Georgia, Congress, 1878 . 

11 

. * . „ j 

9.526 

.319 

Illinois, Treasurer, 1878 . 


21 

7.914 

10.025 

Indiana, Secretary of State, 1878 . 

15 


7.335 

6.534 

Iowa Governor, 1879 . 


ii 

3.209 

5.946 

Kansas, Governor, 1878 .;. 


5 

1.345 

2.676 

Kentucky, Governor, 1879. 

12 

6.660 

4.334 

Louisiana, Governor, 1879.... 

8 


5.076 

2.924 

Maine, Governor, 1879. 


7 

1.393 

3.479 

Maryland, Governor, 1879.... 

8 


4.557 

3.433 

Massachusetts, Governor, 1879. 


ii 

2.474 

6.559 

Michigan, Supreme Judge, 1879.... 


ii 

5.275 

5.725 

Minnesota, Governor, 1879 . 


5 

1.996 

2.702 

Mississippi, Congress, 1878 ... 

8 


5.755 

.340 

Missouri, Congress, 1878 . 

15 


8.348 

2.760 

Nebraska, Supreme Judge, 1879.. 

3 

.871 

1.929 

Nevada, Governor, 1878... 


3 

1.458 

1.542 

New Hampshire, Governor, 1878.. .. 


5 

2.049 

2.512 

New Jersey, Assembly, 1879 ,. 

9 


4.429 

4.352 

New York, Lieutenant Governor, 1879.... 

..... 

35 

17.487 

17.513 

North Carolina, Congress, 1878..... 

io 

„ . 

5.269 

4.030 

Ohio Governor, 1879 . 


22 

10.401 

11.055 

Oregon, Congress, 1878.. 

3 


’ 1.498 

1.395 

Pennsylvania, Treasurer, 1879. 

.... 

29 

12.079 

15.259 

Khode Island, Governor, 1879. 


4 

1.407 

2482 

South Carolina, Congress, 1878.. 

7 


4.912 

1.913 

Tennessee, Congress, 1878... 

12 

.... 

8.570 

2.809 

Texas, Congress, 1878.. 

8 

.... • 

a 214 

.700 

Vermont, Governor, 1878 ... . 


5 

1.487 

3.218 

Virginia, Congress, 1878... 

11 


8.135 

2.572 

West Virginia, Congress. 1878___ 

5 

- . - 

2.551 

1.055 

Wisconsin, Congress, 1878.... 


10 

3.969 

5.319 

Total.. ... 

165 

204: 

185.853 

148.440 


To the regular Democratic vote in Massachusetts we have added 
only one-third the Butler vote, showing a Democratic strength of 46,- 
372, which is not an unfair estimate, as Tilden received over 108,000 in 
the old Bay State in 1876. 

To the regular Democratic vote in Mai ne one-third the Greenback * 
vote is added, making 27,531, which is warranted by the fact that 
Maine gave Tilden 49,917 votes. 

In ail cases where an independent Democrat ran against the regular 





























































The. Presidential Count. 


69 


nominee, the vote for both has been assigned to the Democratic column. 
The votes and percentages under the two systems may be seen by 
reference to the following tabular statement: 


Parties. 

Elec” ! 

System. 

True 1 

rethod. 

Votes. 

Per Cent. 

Votes. 

Per Cent 

Democratic ... 

Republican... 

Greenback and others. 

165 

204 

44.72 

55.28 

185.853 

148.440 

34.707 

50.36 

40.23 

9.41 

Total. . 



369 


369.000 



In the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin. Minne- 
ssta, Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas, in which the Democrats would have 
had no show under the Electoral system, the True Method would 
have given them 63.963 votes; and in the doubtful States of Connec¬ 
ticut, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Colorado, Nevada and California 
the Democrats would have received 39.437 votes under the True 
Method, giving that party almost a certainty of over one hundred 
votes, sixty-four of which they hav# no hope of obtaining under the 
Electoral system, besides nearly forty which are exceedingly doubt¬ 
ful. On the .other hand, the Republicans would have received 
41.678 votes in the States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Mis¬ 
souri, Indiana and Oregon. -- 

HOW THE STATES VOTED. 


STATES 

co 

IO 

X 

rH 

o 

CO 

X 

rH 

CO 

X 

r-l 

| 1868. 

t— ■ 
X 

T—t 

CO 

I- 

X 

*H 

STATES 

to 

no 

X 

n 

o 

CO 

X 

i < 
rM 
CO 
X 

rH 

X 

CO 

X 

rH 

So 

i- 1 

co 

L— 

X 

STATES 

co ! 

lO j 
X 

§ 

X 

rH 

rH 

CO 

X 

rH 

X 

CO 

X 

rH 

t- 

X 

rH 

CO 

t— 

X 

rH 

Ala... 

d 

d 

X 

r 

r 

d 

La ... 

d 

d 

X 

a 

X 

r 

N. C.. 

d 

d 

X 

r 

r 

d 

Ark .. 

d 

d 

X 

r 

X 

d 

Me ... 

r 

r 

r ! 

|r| 

l r 

r 

Ohio. 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Cal.. 

d 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Md... 

f 

d 

r 

a: 

Id 

d 

Greg. 


r 

r 

d 

r 

r 

Col... 






r 

Mass. 

r 

r 

r 

r! 

! r 

r 

Penn. 

d 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Conn 

r 

r 

r 

i 

r 

d 

Mich. 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

R. I.. 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Del... 

d 

d 

d 

d 

r 

d 

Mm... 


r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

S. C.. 

a 

d 

X 

r 

r 

r 

Ela... 

d 

d 

X 

r 

r 

r 

Miss . 

d 

d 

X 

X 

r 

d 

Tenn. 

d 

b 

X 

r 

d 

d 

Ga.. 

! d 

d 

X 

d 

d 

d 

Mo.... 

d 

d 

r 

r 

d 

d 

Texas 

d 

d 

X 

X 

d 

d 

Ills.. 

d 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Neb..., 




r 

r 

r 

Vt ... 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Ind.. 

d 

r 

r 

r 

r, 

d 

Nev.... 



r 

r 

r 

r 

Va .. 

d 

b 

X 

X 

r 

d 

To 

r 

J* 

j* 

y 

i* 

V 

NT FT 


Y 

T 

Y 

r 

! r 

W. V. 



r 

r 

r 

d 

JLd » - 

Kan 



r 

r j 

l 

r 

r j *N. J. 

a 

t 

d 

d 

r | 

d IWis.. 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

r 

Ky. 

d | 

b 

d 

d 

d 

d N. ¥. . 

r 

r 

r 

d 

r ! 

Id 


— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

—. 

No. 

ol 

? States voting.. 








13 

33 

25 

34 

35 

38 


Note —For Democrat, d; for Republican, r; for Bell. b. ‘•‘New Jersey gave Lincoln 
four and Douglas three votes in i860. Maryland voted for I 1 illmore in 1856. Those 
marked x were either excluded from the count or hold no election. 












































































60 


The Presidential Count. 


THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE. 

The following statement shows how the count would stand in a 
vote by the House of Representatives for President, each State hav¬ 
ing one vote; also, how the Senate would stand on a vote for Vico 
President, each Senator having one vote: 



H. 

R. 1 

SEN. 


H. 

R. 

SEN. 


H. 

R. 

SEN. 

STATES. 





STATES. 





STATUS 





D. 

R. 

D. 

R. 

D, 

R. 

D. 

R. 

OJ a J JJjto <t 

D. 

R. 

D. 

R. 

Alabama... 

1 


2 


Louisiana.. 

1 


1 

1 

N. Carolina. 

1 


2 


Arkansas.. 

1 


2 

. 

Maine .... 


1 


2 

Ohio.. 

1 


2 

m 

California . 

. . 

1 

1 

1 

Maryland . 

J 

. . 

*2 


Oregon ... 

1 


2 


Colbradp... 
Conn. 


1 


2 

Mass...... 


1 


2 

Penn. 


1 

1 

1 

•A 


1 

1 

I 

Mich...... 


1 


2 

R. Island.. 


1 


Delaware .. 

1 


2 


Minn ..... 


1 


2 

S. Carolina 

*i 


*2 


Florida ... 

1 


2 


Miss.. 

1 


i 

1 

Tennessee. 

I 


2 


Georgia... 

1 


2 


Missouri.. 

1 


2 


Texas. 

1 


2 


Illinois _ .. 


1 

* 

i 

Neb...... 


1 


2 

Vermont... 


1 


2 

Indiana.... 

t 

f 

1 

2 


Nevada. .. 


1 


2 

Virginia... 
W. Virginia 

1 


2 


Iowa. 


2 

N. Hamp. 


1 

a 

2 

1 

. „ 

2 


Kansas .... 


1 

... 

2 

N. Jersey-f 


1 

2 


Wisconsin. 


1 


2- 

Kentucky .. 

i 

. , 

2 


New York.. 


1 

1 

1 


— 

— 


— 

Total_ 











18 

19 

42 

33. 



•’Senator Davis, of Illinois, is classed as an Independent, tA G-reenbacker has 
the casting vote in the Indiana House delegation. 



































































































































